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ABSTRACT 
This thesis seeks to identify if Ukraine is transitioning to a democracy from an 
authoritarian regime after the breakup of the Soviet Union, and if so, to                               
measure Ukraine's democratic progress applying traits of democratization from the 1990 
parliamentary elections to the 2004 Orange Revolution.  A free and fair electoral process 
involving multiple political parties, representational power of elected officials, and 
executive power, both constrained constitutionally and held accountable by other 
government branches (i.e. the Verkhovna Rada and the judiciary), will be used to 
measure Ukraine's democratic transition. Historical analysis of democracy's progress will 
be examined during the presidencies of Leonid Kravchuk (1991-1994), Leonid Kuchma 
(1994-2004) and Viktor Yushchenko (2004-Present), respectively, to discern if 
democracy has progressed or diminished over the past fifteen years. Ukraine's democratic 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
In the early 1990's, Ukraine experienced a dramatic change in government after 
the collapse of the Soviet Union and Ukraine's pursuit of sovereignty.  These events 
created a paradigm shift as Ukraine transformed from an authoritarian-style closed 
regime toward a democracy.  Although Ukraine employed an electoral process, which 
allowed for the election of presidents and parliamentary members, was it a true 
democratic system containing participatory and publicly contested elections?  The 
Orange Revolution in 2004 signaled a cathartic shift in the electoral process of Ukraine.  
For the first time in Ukraine's history, peaceful public protests overturned a fraudulent 
election resulting in the inauguration of the popular candidate. The Orange Revolution 
removed Viktor Yanukovych and placed the publicly chosen candidate, Viktor 
Yushchenko, in power as president. Yet many question whether democracy will rapidly 
advance in Ukraine according to popular expectations as so far Ukraine has experienced 
only a slow shift toward democratization since its sovereignty.  This thesis seeks to 
answer the following questions:  
Has the electoral process democratically evolved in Ukraine since the first 
Presidential election in 1991?  Are elections becoming freer and fairer? Have Ukraine's 
elections become more democratic as the country moves toward a polyarchal system?  
Does the Ukrainian president have genuine power to act in his constituents’ interests or 
does an outside actor, such as the oligarchs (corrupt billionaire Ukrainian business 
owners) or Russia, influence him?  Does the constitution limit the powers of the president 
and hold him accountable to other branches of government, or does he have absolute 
power? 
These are important questions gauging the progress of a democracy and need to 
be answered.  Free and competitive elections involving multiple political parties are an 
important measure of democracy in that it places the power of choosing leaders in the 
hands of the peoples’ majority vote.  In addition, inherent power within the hands of the 
representatives of the people is a vital criterion of a democracy. This is because in a 
democracy, elected officials must have the power to act in the best interests of the 
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constituency.  When elected leaders are pawns of other organizations (i.e. a foreign 
government, big business interests, or the country's military) they lack the ability to carry 
out the peoples’ will and are often corrupt as they serve the agenda of the influencing 
organization.   In addition, other branches of government must regulate elected officials' 
power, as in a checks and balances system.  A functioning and effective constitution 
which regulates power between the branches of government is paramount, lest one 
branch become dominant over the others.  
In answering these questions, this thesis will attempt to identify if a transition to 
democracy from an authoritarian regime truly occurred in Ukraine after the breakup of 
the Soviet Union in 1991. And if this happened, it will measure Ukraine's democratic 
progress using specific traits of democratization from the Kravchuk, Kuchma and the 
Yushchenko administrations respectively, following the Orange Revolution.   
A. ARGUMENT 
This thesis will argue that with the election of each new president, Ukraine has 
become more democratic, and that the electoral process has become freer and more 
competitive. In addition, this thesis will demonstrate that the executive power in Ukraine 
has been reduced from what is typically seen in former authoritarian regimes like Stalin's 
Russia and is now regulated by the constitution.   An absolutist ruler who is not restricted 
by a constitution or laws characterizes former authoritarian regimes.  In order to gauge 
these changes and Ukraine's progress toward a democracy, the core features of a 
democratic regime must first be identified. They are, as the following literature review 
suggests, the existence of free and fair multi-party elections, the true authority of elected 
officials  who act in the interests of their constituency (i.e. they are not controlled by 
outside actors’ interests), and an executive power who is held accountable by other 
governmental branches.   
B. LITERATURE REVIEW: WHAT IS A DEMOCRACY?  
In order to measure the transition to democracy, the concept of democracy must 
first be defined.  Several definitions of democracy from leading theorists and non-profit 
organizations will be presented in this section to frame the author's tools used to measure 
democracy and specifically democracy's progress in Ukraine.      
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Joseph Schumpeter defined democracy as a system "…for arriving at political 
decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive 
struggle for the people's vote."1  Therefore, the electoral process can be an effective tool 
in which to measure democracy in that officials are elected by the majority vote of the 
citizens.  The "competitive struggle” has occurred in Ukraine between the opposition 
candidates and incumbents in the electoral process since the 1991 presidential elections.  
Furthermore, Samuel Huntington, among other political experts, believed that 
Schumpeter's concept of competitive elections was implicitly necessary in an electoral  
democracy.2 
Another noted expert, Robert Dahl, believes in the concept of a polyarchy, or a 
type of democracy that focuses on three characteristics: popular sovereignty, political 
equality and majority rule.  A polyarchy is a democracy that has equal levels of public 
contestation and participation.3  In addition, Dahl's argument focuses heavily on two 
democratic traits: free and fair elections, and the ability of an opposition to engage in a 
contest against a regime.4  The right to vote in elections encompasses both of Dahl's 
spectrums of democratization. The first involves the availability of his "eight institutional 
characteristics" of contestation, and the other involves the proportion of the population 
who may take advantage of these characteristics.   Dahl's characteristics are laid out in 
Table 1.1 in Polyarchy and include "…the right to vote, free and fair elections, and the 
development of institutions for making government policies depend on votes and other 
expressions of preference."5  A system becomes more democratic and polyarchal as 
elections become more participatory and public contestation becomes valid. On the other 
end of Dahl's spectrum, is the regime type known as closed hegemony.  A closed 
hegemony regime is the least democratic regime according to Dahl.6  In this type of 
system, voter participation is practically nonexistent and there is little or no public 
contestation.     
 
1 Diamond, Larry J. 1999. Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press. 8. 
2 Ibid. 
3 Dahl, Robert A. 1971. Polyarchy; participation and opposition. New Haven: Yale University Press, 
7.  
4 Ibid, 5.  
5 Ibid, 3.  
6 Ibid.  
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Once the population elects officials, these officials must carry out the will of the 
people free from outside influences.  Elected officials should have genuine power and 
they become civil servants who have pledged to serve the public within that democracy.  
A polyarchy is not a liberal democracy.   A polyarchy is a democracy that focuses on 
equal levels of public contestation and participation while a liberal democracy entails 
much more than just electoral democracy.  Diamond believed that a liberal democracy 
was comprised of three criteria, branches of government were held accountable to the 
people and by other branches, there were no hidden power bases in actor's that were not 
accountable to the electorate, and individual rights were protected.7  Additionally there 
are numerous definitions of what a democracy entails.  Larry Diamond has described 
genuine power of elected officials in his definition of liberal democracy:  
1. Control of the state and its key decisions and allocations lies with 
elected officials (and not democratically unaccountable actors or foreign 
powers); in particular, the military is subordinate to the authority of 
elected civilian officials.   
2.  Executive power is constrained constitutionally and held accountable 
by other government institutions (such as an independent judiciary, 
parliament, ombudsman, and other mechanisms of horizontal 
accountability).   
3. Not only are electoral outcomes uncertain, with a significant opposition 
vote and the presumption of party alternation in government, but no group 
that adheres to constitutional principles is denied the right to form a party 
and contest elections (even if electoral thresholds and other rules prevent 
smaller parties from winning representation in parliament).8
 
As has been noted, public contestation is present in both a polyarchy and a liberal 
democracy.  In addition, Diamond's principles are useful in defining democratization as 
his criteria for a liberal democracy depend on a functioning constitution that limits 
executive authority and balances power among the three branches of government.  
Moreover, in Diamond's democratic concept, presidential powers are constrained by the 
constitution, which reduces the chance for an authoritarianism to emerge.     
 
7 Diamond, Developing democracy, 10.  
8 Ibid, 11.  
 5
                                                
There are more elements that are important to share regarding democracy.  For 
example, Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way in “The Rise of Competitive 
Authoritarianism,” give four requirements for a modern democracy:  
1. Executives and legislatures are chosen through elections that are open, 
free, and fair. 
2. Virtually all adults possess the right to vote. 
3. Political rights and civil liberties, including freedom of the press, 
freedom of association, and freedom to criticize the government without 
reprisal, are broadly protected. 
4. Elected authorities possess real authority to govern, in that they are not 
subject to the tutelary control of military or clerical leaders.9
For this study, I will define democracy using Dahl's concept of polyarchy and 
specific elements of Diamond's liberal democracy, including accountable elected officials 
to the citizenry and a constitution that limits executive authority and balances power 
among the three branches of government.  Now that the most easily measured criteria of 
democracy have been stated, it is important to study the evolution of the presidential and 
parliamentary election processes in Ukraine. The Organization for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) election reports from the Ukrainian Parliament, the 
Verkhovna Rada, and presidential elections will aid in measuring the democratic progress 
of Ukraine's electoral process.10  Specifically the Office for Democratic Institutions and 
Human Rights (ODIHR), an agency of the OSCE, has produced a library of election 
reports covering elections in Ukraine.  An examination of these reports for each 
president's election will help to show the success or failure of Ukraine's democratization 
with regard to a free and fair electoral process.  ODIHR is committed to preserving 
democratic traditions and aids countries in developing a free and fair electoral elections 
process, and their data will prove to be valuable to this research.       
Another independent source, Freedom House, will be used to further measure 
democratic progress.  Its freedom scores, derived from a scoring system based on 
political rights and civil liberties, give a baseline for measuring democratic progress 
within each president's term and will provide more depth where OSCE reports are 
 
9 Levitsky, Steven, and Lucan A. Way. "The Rise of Competitive Authoritarianism." Journal of 
Democracy 13, no. 2 (Apr, 2002): 51. 
10 Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights - Elections. Internet on-line. Available from 
http://www.osce.org/odihr-elections/13748.html.  (Accessed 20 March 2006).   
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unavailable.11  This non-profit organization evaluates each country for their potential as 
an electoral democracy.12  It measures political rights as the ability to participate in the 
electoral process- the right to vote, the right to run for office, and the right to elect 
representatives who are responsible to the people.  Although Freedom House's list of civil 
liberties includes the freedoms of expression and belief, associational and organizational 
rights, rule of law and personal autonomy without interference from the state, these 
measurements will not be included in the author's democratization study as they fall 
outside the author's scope of measurement.  The combined average of each country’s 
political rights and civil liberties ratings determines an overall status of “Free”, “Partly 
Free”, or “Not Free”.  The Freedom House has published an annual assessment of the 
state of freedom in several countries known as Freedom in the World since 1972.13   
Individual countries are evaluated based on questions of political rights and civil liberties 
derived in large measure from the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Freedom 
House's requirements for an electoral democracy are as follows:  
1. A competitive multiparty political system.  
2. Universal adult suffrage for all citizens. 
3. Regularly contested elections, conducted in conditions of ballot secrecy. 
4. Significant public access of major political parties to the electorate 
through the media and through generally open political campaigning.14  
 
In addition, the Bertelsmann Transformation Index (BTI) will be utilized. A 
publication of the Bertelsmann Foundation, it evaluates 115 countries for democracy.  It 
has a checklist of eighteen indicators, measuring democracy through stateness, political 
participation, rule of law, institutional stability, and political and social integration. 15 
 
11 OSCE election reports are unavailable for the Kravchuk administration as the OSCE team was not 
present for Ukraine's first presidential election in 1991.  
12 Freedom House evaluations use a scale of 1-7 with 1 representing the highest degree of  freedom 
present, and 7 being the least amount of freedom. Freedom in the World Survey Methodology.  Database 
on-line.  Available from Freedom House,  
http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=35&year=2005.  (Accessed 4 Dec 2005).  
13 Freedom in the World Comparative Rankings 1972-2004.  Database on-line. Available from 
Freedom House.    http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=15&year=2005. (Accessed 1 May 
2006).  
14   Freedom in the World Survey Methodology.  Database on-line.  Available from Freedom House,  
http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=35&year=2005. (Accessed 4 Dec 2005).   
15 BTI Table and Indicators. Internet on-line. Available from Available from Bertelsmann Stiftung, 
Shaping Change: Strategies of Development and Transformation, http://bti2003.bertelsmann-
transformation-index.de/fileadmin/pdf/BERT_Criteria_Indicato_ENGL.pdf . (Accessed 21 June 2006) 
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Therefore, an expanded concept of democracy is expressed by assessing the strength of 
civil society and participatory behavior.  Finally, transparency and accountability indicate 
the actual functioning of formal democratic structures.  BTI’s overall score is based on 
the average of the scores obtained from the political transformation study, and the BTI 
amplifies Ukraine's participation in the free and fair electoral process16.  Unfortunately, 
the BTI will only apply in 2003, toward President Kuchma's second term, as it only 
published one study in 2003, and there were no earlier BTI surveys conducted.      
C. METHODOLOGY AND SOURCES  
The three indicators of a democracy for the purpose of this study (i.e. the 
existence of free and fair multi-party elections, the true authority of elected officials who 
act in the interests of their constituency and an executive power who is held accountable 
by other governmental branches) have been in question throughout Ukraine's post-Soviet 
history.  They are relevant because the electoral process has undergone changes as far as 
the degree of its freedom and fairness, because there have been allegations of Ukrainian 
big business and Russian influence over elected officials and because the Constitution of 
Ukraine has been amended several times over the past fifteen years.  
While other measures exist that could evaluate progress toward democracy in 
Ukraine, such as universal adult suffrage, free press, and rule of law, they are not 
included in this study for several reasons.  First, universal suffrage within Ukraine has 
been consistent throughout the country's existence.  Both men and women have been 
afforded the opportunity to vote in past elections.  Second, in Ukraine there has been 
limited freedom of the press to report objectively as demonstrated during the Kravchuk 
presidential campaign and during the Kuchma administration.  Leonid Kravchuk received 
massive countrywide exposure and support largely due to the additional television 
coverage that was not afforded to the other presidential candidates.  Moreover, the 
Ukrainian press was silenced during the "Cassette scandal" when President Kuchma was 
accused of involvement in the abduction and murder of journalist Georgiy Gongadze.  
 
16 The score for "Political Transformation" is obtained by calculating the mean value of the ratings for 
the following criteria: stateness, political participation, rule of law, stability of democratic institutions, and 
political and social integration. A score of 10 is awarded for the best progress toward a market-based 
democracy while a 1 represents the lowest performance.  Internet on-line.  Available from Bertelsmann 
Stiftung, Shaping Change: Strategies of Development and Transformation, http://www.bertelsmann-
transformation-index.de/37.0.html?&L=1.  (Accessed 5 December 2005). 
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Finally, rule of law is a questionable measure of democracy for Ukraine, as there is still a 
"secret police" mentality, which resides within Ukrainian society from its former Soviet 
Union membership.  There is undue interference in personal lives by the state, and mafia  
corruption exists within Ukraine.    
Therefore, this thesis will support the argument by using a process-tracing 
method.  This method will provide a historical analysis and examine the degree to which 
free competitive elections involving multiple political parties occurred, establish if 
elected officials truly represented their constituents, and establish whether executive 
power is held accountable by other government branches during each President's term.  
Chapters II through IV will examine the administrations of Leonid Kravchuk, Leonid 
Kuchma, and Victor Yushchenko respectively, and determine if the author's measures of 
democratization were absent, developing, or present.  OSCE election reports from 
Ukraine's presidential and parliamentary elections will measure the democratic progress 
of Ukraine's electoral process.17  ODIHR has produced extensive detailed election reports 
covering Ukraine's presidential and parliamentary elections, and this data is paramount to 
the argument.  The conclusions of these reports compiled during each presidential and 
parliamentary election will confirm or deny Ukraine's democratization with regard to free 
and fair elections.  In addition, each president's term will be examined for the presence of 
democratic traits, mainly increasing participation in elections as well as formation of 
opposition.   Furthermore, Freedom House scores will be used at various points in each 
president's term to provide additional information on the status of political rights.  
Finally, Chapter V will provide a compilation of results and provide a spectrum 
measuring Ukraine's progress toward democracy following each President's term. The 
end state of the study is to gauge the progress of democracy in Ukraine.    
 
17 Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights - Elections. Internet on-line. Available from 
http://www.osce.org/odihr-elections/13748.html.  (Accessed 20  March 2006).   
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II. UKRAINE'S BEGINNING UNDER LEONID KRAVCHUK 
This chapter will address the criteria of democracy previously established under 
the Kravchuk Administration.  This will provide a baseline for Ukraine and determine if 
Ukraine was making progress towards becoming a democracy during this administration.  
Prior to Kravchuk's election, Ukraine was still very much under a fake parliamentary 
system of government that was controlled by the Communist Party of Ukraine (CPU).  It 
was hardly democratic as there were no differing branches of government and no 
substantial opposition to the CPU.  The Kravchuk era was significant as several 
developments occurred changing the political fabric of Ukraine as it became a sovereign 
republic.  Most importantly, the system of government was changing from a fake 
parliamentary style of government that had existed under the communist party to a 
presidential system.  In May 1991, the Verkhovna Rada, Ukraine's parliament, "…took 
the initial decision to establish a presidential form of government for the republic of 
Ukraine."18   This was initiated with changes to the Constitution of Ukraine, including 
revisions and amendments, specifically the 1991 Law of the Presidency.  This created the 
office of president and delineated powers between the branches of government.19  
Another change occurred in the parliament. Despite the fact that the Communist Party of 
Ukraine (CPU) dominated the Verkhovna Rada, Rukh, a strongly democratic political 
force, united smaller political parties under the mantle of the Democratic Bloc and gained 
a foothold.  As a result, voter participation increased and public contestation emerged for 
the first time in the electoral process.20  The parliamentary elections of 1990 Ukraine 
indeed involved multiple political parties.  These new political parties signaled a move 
toward public contestation as the Communist Party of Ukraine splintered.  The 1991 
Presidential election involving Leonid Kravchuk was the first democratic election since 
Ukraine declared sovereignty from the Soviet Union in August 1991.  Although this was 
a step toward democracy, according to Dahl’s definition, the legislation defining 
executive powers was vague, which later contributed to problems within this office.  
 
18 Kuzio, Taras, and Andrew Wilson. 1994. Ukraine: perestroika to independence. New York: St. 
Martin's Press, 166.  
19 Taras, Ray. 1997. Postcommunist presidents. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 
69.  
20 Kuzio and Wilson, Ukraine: perestroika to independence, 125 and 187.  
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Unfortunately, Ukraine suffered from an ineffective Constitution during the Kravchuk 
administration, and despite several additional amendments, the constitution failed to 
constrain executive and parliamentary power.      
A. LEONID KRAVCHUK: FROM SUPREME COUNCIL TO PRESIDENT 
(1990-1994) 
Balance of power aside, Leonid Kravchuk's actions during his presidency were a 
symbol of Ukraine’s journey toward democracy.  In addition, Ukraine's Declaration of 
Sovereignty was the first instance of Ukrainian citizens guiding their country's future by 
the voting process.  The parliamentary elections of 1990 as well as the first presidential 
election in 1991 were democratic: free and fair and involving several parties.  As Prime 
Minister in 1990, Kravchuk had mobilized the population behind him with the promise of 
Ukrainian independence from the Soviet Union.  This platform of independence would 
carry him to victory in the December 1991 presidential election.  Conservatives and 
reformists viewed Kravchuk as a compromise figure, avoiding confrontation from both 
sides while adeptly mediating concerns of the leftist communists and the new Ukrainian 
nationalists.  His belief in Ukrainian independence trumped his belief in his own party, 
eventually causing his departure from CPU in August 1991.   
Although President Kravchuk was able to mobilize the population with 83 percent 
support for Ukrainian sovereignty, he was unable to implement reforms needed to further 
Ukraine's democratization, specifically a working Constitution that effectively defined 
his office as president and established a functional judiciary.21  While the 1991 Law of 
the Presidency established basic operating procedures for the office of president, it did 
little to delineate the executive powers between the president and parliament.  More 
importantly, article seven of the law afforded Leonid Kravchuk the power to issue 
decrees and reorganize the government.22   Unfortunately, in tying himself so closely to 
Ukraine's independence to win the presidential election, Kravchuk left himself little room 
to maneuver politically and was unable to implement reforms.  His platform, advocating 
an independent Ukraine, actually contributed to his downfall.  He had won the election by 
a sizeable margin of 62 percent, but "…the corps of his support was essentially the same 
 
21 Taras, Postcommunist presidents, 78.  
22 Kuzio and Wilson, Ukraine: perestroika to independence, 166.   
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people who had voted for the Communists in 1990."23  And, if he had attempted 
implementation of reform he would have betrayed his leftwing electorate.  As if that were 
not enough, his administration was marred with economic failure as hyperinflation 
reached staggering levels, upwards of 5,371 percent in 1993. 24 
B. FREEDOM SCORES MEASURING UKRAINE'S DEMOCRACY UNDER 
LEONID KRAVCHUK 
During the Kravchuk Administration, Freedom House awarded Ukraine the 
following scores:   
 PR CL Status 
1991 3 3 PF 
1992 3 3 PF 
1993 4 4 PF 
 
Table 1 Freedom House scores during the Kravchuk Presidency. (From Ref 25)  
"PR" stands for Political Rights, "CL" stands for Civil Liberties, and "PF" 
stands for partly free.  Freedom House evaluations use a scale of 1-7 with 
1 representing the highest degree of  freedom present, and 7 being the 
lowest level. 25 
As noted, Ukraine's PR scores moved from three to four during the Kravchuk's 
presidential term signifying that exercise of political rights became less free.  
1. Rising Public Participation and Contestation as Political Parties Form 
Although the actions of the president could be viewed as less than ideal, one of 
the most notable results was in the electoral process itself.  The Ukraine was able to 
evolve from corrupt Soviet electoral practices to free and fair electoral practices.  This 
was mainly evident in the Verkhovna Rada elections of 1990 and the Presidential 
elections of 1991.   
                                                 
23 Wilson, Andrew. 2002. The Ukrainians: Unexpected nation. New Haven: Yale University Press. 
183. 
24 Wilson, The Ukrainians: Unexpected nation, 254.   
25  Freedom in the World Comparative Rankings 1972-2004.  Database on-line. Available from 
Freedom House.    http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=15&year=2005. (Accessed 1 May 
2006).  
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a.   Emergence of the Democratic Bloc 
The 1990 Verkhovna Rada elections were pivotal to the development of  
public contestation as the CPU opposing Democratic Bloc (DB) emerged and gained 
support in Galicia and L'viv, as well as other areas of Ukraine.  The People's Movement 
of Ukraine, or Rukh, was widely popular and drove the agenda of the DB.  Additionally 
"…the activities of Rukh have led to the creation of a number of other opposition political 
parties."26  Even though the Democratic Bloc was composed of several different political 
parties, they all shared common goals of the pursuit of Ukrainian sovereignty, reform, 
independence, and a market economy.27  Political parties opposing the CPU were the 
People's Movement of Ukraine (Rukh), Ukrainian Democratic Party (UDP), Ukrainian 
Republican Party (URP), Ukrainian Helsinki Union (UHU), Ukrainian Green Party 
(UPZ), and the Party of Democratic Revival of Ukraine (PDRU).  These emerging 
political parties would not sweep the country in the 1990 Verkhovna elections as most of 
the seats went to the CPU.28  However, their mere presence signaled a growing 
opposition to the CPU.  Although the opposition was confined to 25-33 percent of the 
vote, its existence demonstrated the presence of a functioning multiparty election 
process.29  Anatoli Pohribnyi, Rukh organizer, noted that the sheer presence of so many 
candidates for the Verkhovna Rada elections of 1990 was a step toward democracy. "The 
fact that there are so many candidates is a colossal achievement.  In some districts, it is 
unbelievable, they're bursting with democracy.  In my electoral district, there are twenty-
four candidates."30  Moreover, the Verkhovna Rada elections of 1990 were far more 
democratic than the previous year's elections "…as there were no slots in parliament that 
 
26 Fishel, Gene, "Radicalization of Independence in Ukraine," Perspective, Volume 1, No 4 (April 
1991). Journal on-line. Available from the Institute for the Study of Conflict, Ideology & Policy, 
http://www.bu.edu/iscip/vol1/Fishel.html.  (Accessed 9 May 2006).  
27 Ibid.  
28 Election Watch .  Journal of Democracy, Volume 4 (October 1990). Internet on-line. Available 
from the Journal of Democracy, 
http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/journal_of_democracy/election_watch/v001/index.html#1.3special report.  
(Accessed  8 May 2006).   
29 Kuzio and  Wilson, Ukraine: Perestroika to Independence, 14. 
30 Solchanyk, Roman. 1992.  Interview with Anatoli Pohribnyi, Rukh organizer.  Ukraine, from 
Chernobyl' to sovereignty: A collection of interviews. New York: St. Martin's Press,  73-74.  
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had been previously assigned to specific political parties and the district committees 
automatically disqualified no candidates."31   
 
Political party Election seats won in 1990 Verkhovna Rada Elections 







Table 2 Results of 1990 Verkhovna Rada Elections32 
 
While Rukh enjoyed the widest exposure and was popular within all 
regions of Ukraine, the smaller parties were unsuccessful in mobilizing against the CPU 
as each had its own particular agenda and refused to form a coalition party.  For example, 
"…the URP wished to preserve its distinctive profile while the PRDU saw itself as 
centrist and distrusted Rukh's growing nationalism."33  Rukh sought to pull the other 
parties together, but failed in this endeavor making enemies on both sides of Ukrainian 
political society.  Eventually, the CPU felt threatened by Rukh's popularity, and targeted 
it with obstacles to impede its inevitable success.  Government authorities went against 
Prime Minister Kravchuk's promise to Rukh leaders and failed to register the Rukh party 
in time for the first round parliamentary elections in 1990.34  Unfortunately, the 
parliamentary elections were not entirely free as the CPU still wielded a fair amount of 
control in parliament (See Table 2, Results of 1990 Verkhovna Rada Elections).   The 
CPU unduly influenced the election process by controlling the electoral committee, 
                                                 
31 Arel, Dominique, "The Parliamentary Blocks in the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet: Who and What do 
they Represent?" Journal of Soviet Nationalities, Vol  I, no. 4 (Winter 1990-91), 115 
32 Fishel, "Radicalization of Independence in Ukraine."  
33 Kuzio and Wilson, Ukraine: Perestroika to Independence , 157. 
34 Ibid, 124. 
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"…which often refused to investigate electoral law violations."35  Even with the electoral 
law violations, there was still an obvious and growing opposition emerging in Ukraine.   
Fortunately, the Democratic Bloc (DB) fared better in the larger cities of 
Ukraine and their support signaled a break from the Communist party control.  Analysis 
of the breakdown of elected deputies in the 1990 parliamentary elections yields 
interesting results regarding a lessening of CPU dominance.  "The CPU obtained 25 and 
30 percent of its seats from rural constituencies, seats in the big towns were split roughly 
equally - 50 going to the CPU, 36 to the uncommitted, and 66 to the DB."36  This 
increased support for the DB signaled that public contestation against the CPU was 
rising.      
Slowly, the Democratic Bloc was beginning to wrest power from the CPU.  
Despite its strength in the urban areas, the DB had considerable problems gaining support 
in the rural areas because of the CPU's control of the media.  In any case, the 
parliamentary elections "…signaled the end of end of the CPU monopoly in Ukraine and 
therefore represented a watershed in the development of the opposition." 37  The elections 
were a victory for the multiparty election process representative of Dahl's concept of 
polyarchal democracy.  The opposition, with its nationalistic agenda, would eventually 
champion Ukraine's Declaration of Sovereignty the following year.  Additionally voter 
participation increased considerably as the population's voting percentage was 84.69 
percent in the first round and 78.80 percent. 38   
b. Ukraine's First Presidential Election 
The 1991 Ukrainian presidential elections were pivotal to the emergence 
of democracy in two regards: voter participation was on the rise and contestation 
emerged in the form of multiple political parties that had contrary views to the CPU.  
Ukraine's 1991 Declaration of Sovereignty, overwhelmingly approved by the Verkhovna 
Rada, defined the sovereignty of Ukraine as "…supremacy, independence, fullness and 
indivisibility of the republic's authority within the boundaries of its territory, and its 
 
35 Kuzio and Wilson, Ukraine: Perestroika to Independence, 125.  
36 Ibid.  
37 Ibid, 126.  
38 Ibid, 125.  
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independence and equality in external relations."39 This would be the foundation of 
Leonid Kravchuk's presidential campaign and generate the necessary public support to 
win Ukraine's first Presidential election of 1991.   
The 1991 Presidential election in Ukraine ended up being a multiparty 
election involving six candidates of differing political affiliations.  Primary contenders 
included Leonid Kravchuk (Communist Party of Ukraine), Levko Lukianenko (Ukrainian 
Republican Party), Ihor Iukhnovskyi and Vladimir Grinev (both from the Party of 
Democratic Revival of Ukraine), Leopold Taburianskyi (People's Party), and Viacheslav 
Chornovil (Rukh).40   Unfortunately, organization of legitimate political parties was 
problematic during this period and only the most organized parties could actually 
generate the required 100,000 signatures to put forth a candidate, which reduced the 
original number of ninety-five candidates down to six.41  Despite the fact that the 
majority of the political parties within the DB actually shared similar interests and goals 
toward Ukrainian sovereignty they continued to have organizational problems. .  
Additionally, the smaller parties, notably the People's Party, were structurally weak and 
not well known.  In the end, the real competition for the Presidency was between 
Kravchuk and Chornovil.  Kravchuk won with a landslide victory with 61.6 percent of 
the vote.  He triumphed in five of eight major regions of Ukraine while Chornovil swept 
the regions of Galicia and Kyiv.42  Although this was a seemingly one-sided election for 
Kravchuk, the votes for Chornovil in major urban centers signaled an emergence of 
support for Ukrainian nationalism and a break from the CPU.  The once strong 
Communist hold on Ukraine was beginning to diminish as democracy emerged.   
While the emergence of multiple political parties is paramount to the 
success of a fledgling democracy as it signifies the emergence of an opposition, other 
factors also need to be explored.  For example, although voter participation was relatively 
high in this election (84.2 percent of those eligible to vote turned out) there is some 
 
39 "Ukraine proclaims sovereignty," The Ukrainian Weekly, 22 July 1990. Internet on-line. Available 
from the Ukrainian Weekly, http://www.ukrweekly.com/Archive/1990/299001.shtml. (Accessed 16 May 
2006).  
40 Kuzio and Wilson, Ukraine: Perestroika to Independence , 185.  
41 Ibid.   
42 Ibid, 187.  
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question as to a media that was biased toward Kravchuk.43  Because the CPU backed 
Kravchuk, he secured the lion's share of media coverage during his campaign, and as 
mentioned earlier, the smaller parties were relatively unknown in Ukraine's outlying 
areas, predominantly the rural South and East.  Therefore, these elections lacked a degree 
of fairness as all six candidates did not receive equal media coverage and public 
exposure.         
2. Kravchuk Sheds USSR Influence but not CPU's 
There is a question as to whether President Kravchuk genuinely represented his 
constituency's interests and was not influenced by outside actors, and if he was controlled 
by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union during his term as president. To recall the 
definition of democracy from Larry Diamond, independent power lies with elected 
officials and their appointees, rather than with unaccountable internal actors (e.g., the 
military or foreign powers).  Way and Levitsky also stated that elected authorities possess 
legitimate power to govern, in that they are not subject to the control of military or 
clerical leaders.  The 1991 Law of Ukrainian Presidency defined President Kravchuk's 
executive powers and enabled him to stand against the existing USSR.  In fact, the law 
actually established the position of the president and article seven of the law gave him 
powers "…to suspend the actions of the USSR if those actions conflicted with the best 
interests of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic (SSR)."44  Furthermore, internal 
actors such as the military did not control Kravchuk.  In early 1992, Ukraine had no 
military.  One of Kravchuk's first acts in office was to establish Ukraine's military and 
name himself as Commander in Chief of the Ukrainian Armed Forces.    
As to whether Kravchuk acted in the national interests of the citizenry, this was 
indicated by his actions at the 1991 referendum.  Gorbachev called this referendum in 
1991 and posed a central question to the USSR citizenry to determine the future of the 
Soviet Union.  Additionally, Kravchuk and the Galician oppositionists seized this 
opportunity to pose additional questions to the Verkhovna Rada concerning Ukraine's 
future in the USSR and complete independence, known respectively as the Ukrainian 
 
43 Kuzio and Wilson, Ukraine: Perestroika to Independence , 186.    
44 Taras, Ray. 1997. Postcommunist presidents. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 
69.  
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questions and the Galician question.45  The March 1991 referendum posed three central 
questions to the population pertaining to the future of the Soviet Union.  Citizens were 
then required to vote on these in order of importance. These were known as the 
Gorbachev question, the Ukrainian question, and the Galician question.  They are as 
follows:  
Gorbachev question: Do you consider it necessary to preserve the USSR 
as a renewed federation of equal sovereign republics?  
Ukrainian question: Do you agree that Ukraine should be part of a Union 
of Soviet Sovereign States based on the Declaration of State Sovereignty 
of Ukraine? 
Galician question: Do you want Ukraine to become an independent state 
which independently decides its domestic and foreign policies?46  
 
The Gorbachev question received support from 70.5 percent of those who cast the 
votes, the Ukrainian question 80.2 percent, and the Galicia question 88.4 percent 
(however, this third question was only voted upon in Galicia).47 As the Ukrainian option 
reflected the will of a majority of all of the people, Kravchuk acted upon it by pursuing 
the negotiation of a commonwealth of sovereign states, which would later become the 
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).  
While Kravchuk might have been successful in making decisions on behalf of a 
majority of his constituents regarding their independence, Kravchuk's independent 
presidential power according to Diamond's democratic requirements was questionable.  
Although he acted in his constituency's interest for sovereignty, the CPU still largely 
influenced him.  Even though Kravchuk was able to mobilize the populace toward 
support of Ukrainian sovereignty, he still faced considerable opposition in the inherently 
corrupt Verkhovna Rada.  The entrenched CPU within the Verkhovna Rada was not 
receptive to necessary democratic institutional reforms.  Kravchuk saw himself as a 
bridge between the communist left and the Ukrainian nationalists.  Unfortunately, he 
acquiesced in implementing economic reforms and did not use his decrees to influence 
Ukraine's economy; he did not press for the implementation of privatization laws passed 
 
45 Kuzio and Wilson, Ukraine: Perestroika to Independence, 159.  
46 Ibid.  
47 Ibid.  
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in 1992-1993. 48   Understanding that he was placed in office by the center-left, many of 
his decrees were anti-market in spirit, which would later prove to hinder Ukraine's future 
implementation of economic reforms. 
3. Executive Power Undefined and Shared Among Branches 
According to the 1978 Constitution of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, 
which was still in effect during Kravchuk's term as president, all power was vested in the 
people, which meant, until 1990, exclusively the communist party.  The citizenry elected 
the parliamentarians, known as deputies, to legislatures at various levels of the territorial-
administrative divisions of the republics, from the village level all the way to the 
Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, and the Verkhovna Rada had absolute power to govern the 
state, according to Articles 80, 82, and 97 of the SSR Constitution.  Of course, this power 
had been on paper only until the communist system began to disintegrate in the 1990s – 
and then suddenly the articles of the Constitution acquired real political meaning and 
power.  Article 80 stated that the Verkhovna Rada created the structures of the state and 
managed the legislative and other branches of government through regional levels of 
control.   Article 82 professed that deputies, through the created branches, manage all 
fields of state, social and cultural developments, make the decisions and conduct a strict 
control to perform them.  Finally, Article 97 cited the Verkhovna Rada as the supreme 
governing body in Ukraine.49 Although the 1991 Law of the Presidency attempted to 
divide the Verkhovna Rada's legislative power base among branches of power, 
implementation of the law still faced resistance from the CPU within the Verkhovna 
Rada.    
While the 1991 Law of the Presidency established basic operating procedures for 
the office of President, it did little to delineate power between the President and 
Verkhovna Rada.  The Law did give some modicum of executive power to Kravchuk, as 
Article 7 gave the president the power to issue decrees and to reorganize the Cabinet of 
Ministers, but he still had no veto power over the Verkhovna Rada's legislative ability as 
 
48 Taras,  Postcommunist presidents, 78.  
49 See Article 80, 82, and 97 of 1978 SSR Constitution.  Internet on-line, Available from 
http://zakon.rada.gov.ua/cgi-bin/laws/main.cgi?nreg=888%2D09.  (Accessed 10 June 2006).    
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prescribed by Article 5.50  Under Kravchuk, the executive was substantially weaker than 
the Verkhovna Rada.   
 The Constitution was in need of reconstruction after Ukrainian independence in 
1991, since it was still plagued with Soviet holdover articles.  For example, in order to 
resemble a true democratic constitution, it would need to divide power among the 
executive, parliamentary and judicial branches of government.  President Kravchuk 
organized a constitutional commission in October 1990 designed to overhaul Ukraine's 
constitution, but it was unsuccessful in building an effective checks and balances system 
among the three branches of government due to resistance from the CPU within the 
Verkhovna Rada.  Unfortunately, the Verkhovna Rada was corrupt and the entrenched 
CPU was not receptive to necessary democratic institutional reforms.  Later, the 1993 
revision of the Constitution was more concerned with reversing Prime Minister Kuchma's 
liberalizing economic programs as President Kravchuk attempted to consolidate power. 
As a result, Ukraine's system of governance was transforming into the classic model of a 
mixed presidential-parliamentary system that was unable to resolve disputes between the 
two main branches of state.  The Ukrainian Constitution did not set precedent for 
regulation of power between branches, and the judicial branch was completely 
ineffective.  "Even with dozens of amendments, it failed to define either the separation of 
powers between the legislature and the executive branches or their responsibilities." 51 
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Kravchuk continued to work with the 
constitutional commission to revise Ukraine's constitution and provide more power to the 
office of the President.  In 1992, he created articles that established cabinet positions, 
declared himself head of state and of executive power.  Additional constitutional 
amendments granted him the power to issue decrees on questions of economic reforms 
not regulated by Ukrainian law.  Issuing decrees and gaining the ability to manage the 
cabinet were sweeping changes that broadened the powers of the President, however two 
reforms passed in 1992 extended his powers to the oblast level, which hindered 
democratic contestation and conflicted with Kravchuk's character as a coalition builder.  
 
50 Kuzio and Wilson, Ukraine: Perestroika to Independence, 166. 
51 Dawisha, Karen, and Bruce Parrott. 1997. The consolidation of democracy in east-central Europe. 
Cambridge, U.K. ; New York, NY, USA: Cambridge University Press, 358. 
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The 1992 reforms created the Presidential Advisory Council (Duma) and the system of 
presidential prefects (predstavnyky) in the Ukrainian provinces.52  Each of these 
organizations was created as an advising body to the President, yet each one evolved into 
a personal implementation committee of the President's decrees in the oblasts.  Moreover, 
the Duma and predstavnyky usurped the power of provincial leaders who were not in line 
with Kravchuk's views, seemingly in a return to authoritarianism.  Both of these 
organizations were "soon being denounced, particularly on the left as unelected 
unconstitutional and unaccountable."53 In this regard, Ukraine experienced a regression 
in democracy under Kravchuk.  Although the 1991 Law of the Presidency afforded 
Leonid Kravchuk the power to issue decrees and reorganize the government, it did not 
allow him the ability to dissolve the Verkhovna Rada, thus his powers were limited by 
the constitution and heavily constrained by the Verkhovna Rada.54  
If Kravchuk would not use his executive power to reform Ukraine, then Leonid 
Kuchma, as Ukraine's Prime Minister in September 1992, surely would.  Eventually 
Kuchma would enact several measures to empower himself as Prime Minister and wean 
power away from the President.  As Prime Minister, Kuchma "… asked for and obtained 
the abolition of the Duma… the transfer of Kravchuk's emergency powers of decree to 
regulate the economy to himself for a six-month period."55  Kuchma resigned a year later 
and Kravchuk tried to consolidate power and implement market reforms through the 
cabinet of ministers.  He would prove to be unsuccessful in those exploits.   
C. CONCLUSIONS 
There were some successful moves toward democracy during Kravchuk’s 
presidency as the country moved away from a fake parliamentary system of government 
and the CPU lost influence to the emerging DB. For the first time there were free and 
competitive elections involving multiple political parties during the 1990 Verkhovna 
Rada elections and the presidential election of 1991.  A large percentage of voters 
participated in the election and there were many candidates of varying political 
affiliations besides the CPU.  This showed an increase in polyarchal characteristics.   A 
 
52 Taras, Postcommunist presidents, 75-76.  
53 Ibid.  
54 Kuzio and Wilson, Ukraine: Perestroika to Independence , 166.  
55 Taras, Postcommunist presidents , 79.  
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polyarchy is a specific type of democracy in that it is concerned more with the electoral 
process, particularly increasing voter participation as well as the presence of an 
opposition to the majority.  More importantly, increased voter participation in these 
elections showed that the population was interested in a democratic future for Ukraine.    
In both of these election proceedings, there was an emergence of the opposition to the 
CPU as the Democratic Bloc parties represented Ukrainian nationalism.  The split within 
the Verkhovna Rada did yield a push toward the democratic end of the spectrum with the 
emergence of the Democratic Bloc as Rukh caused a tremor within the Rada as it gained 
support and chipped away at the entrenched CPU majority. While the DB still 
represented a minority within the Verkhovna Rada, its very existence signaled the 
presence of a growing opposition.    
According to Diamond's elements of a liberal democracy, elected officials 
accountable to the citizenry and a constitution that regulated power amongst government 
branches, Ukraine did not fare so well under Kravchuk in either criterion.  President 
Kravchuk's independent power as an elected official was questionable as certain outside 
actors influenced his decision-making process while others did not.  While he acted in the 
national interests of his constituency, specifically in the pursuit of Ukrainian sovereignty, 
the CPU in the Verkhovna Rada was able to curb him.  Kravchuk bowed neither to the 
Ukrainian military nor to the desires of the USSR.  Furthermore, his declaration that the 
President was also Commander in Chief of the Ukrainian military assured that he 
controlled the military, and not vice versa.  In addition, his nationalistic platform was 
contrary to the desires of the USSR, which sought to keep Ukraine within the Russian 
sphere of influence as posed by the Gorbachev question.   
Executive power was not constrained constitutionally, but it was held accountable 
by other government branches.  The Verkhovna Rada was largely in control of the 
Ukrainian political system much as it was under the SSR Constitution of 1978.  Kravchuk 
could not check the power of the Verkhovna Rada, as he had no veto power or ability to 
dissolve the Rada.  The Constitution of Ukraine under Kravchuk was still representative 
of the leftover 1978 Soviet Constitution in several regards because it still did not clearly 
differentiate power between executive, judicial and legislative branches.  "There was no 
centralized political power, and parliament, the government, and the president all shared 
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and contested executive and legislative power."56  Further, the constitution "…preserved 
the main elements of the 'system of Soviets' with its 'unity of power' and its lack of the 
separation of competencies between branches of government." 57  Under Kravchuk, the 
document was amended to define more clearly the status and powers of the President, but 
it remained inadequate for the task of constructing a democratic state.  
During the Kravchuk administration from 1991-1994, Ukraine satisfactorily met 
one of the three democratization criteria outlined in Chapter I.  The author's most 
important criteria of democracy was achieved, that of a free and fair electoral process as 
greater participation and contestation were observed in both the 1990 Verkhovna Rada 
elections and the 1991 Presidential elections.  President Kravchuk's power as an elected 
official was genuine in that he tried to act in the national interest; however he was still 
influenced by the CPU.   Finally, Ukraine's weak constitution did not effectively develop 
a checks and balances system between the branches of government.  Additionally, the 
Verkhovna Rada was still largely in control of the Ukrainian political system and was not 
limited by the president.  Finally, Ukraine was considered as only "partly free" as 
assessed by the Freedom House.  
 
56 Van Zon, Hans, "Political Culture and Neo-Patrimonialism under Leonid Kuchma," Problems of 
Post Communism 52, no. 5. (September/October 2005): 13. 
57 Protsyk, Oleh, "Constitutional Politics and Presidential power in Kuchma's Ukraine," Problems of 
Post Communism 52, no. 5 (September/October 2005): 24. 
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III. MATURITY OF DEMOCRACY UNDER LEONID KUCHMA   
A. LEONID KUCHMA: FROM PRIME MINISTER TO PRESIDENT (1994-
2004) 
This chapter addresses the development of democracy under Leonid Kuchma's 
administration.  As Ukraine's second president, his period in office was dramatically 
different from that of Leonid Kravchuk, as the Kuchma era represented a return to state 
control, corruptive practices, and authoritarianism.  The free and fair electoral process 
was consistently biased and influenced by the state seen in both the Verkhovna Rada and 
presidential elections, and Kuchma later lost popularity in his second term largely due to 
his involvement in the "cassette scandals" allegedly implicating him in the murder of the 
opposition reporter Heorhiy Gongadze. Unlike President Kravchuk, Kuchma actually 
implemented presidential power and was effective in using it.  During this period, there 
was a distinct power transfer between the executive and legislative branches of 
government, and the power base shifted to the presidency, as the Verkhovna Rada grew 
weaker and more factionalized.  The Rada's factious nature stemmed from the ailing CPU 
as it lost dominance in the 2002 elections.  Kuchma attempted to dramatically expand 
executive power beyond constitutional limits and quell the opposition.  He was overly 
consumed with control, and often circumvented the Verkhovna Rada's legislative 
authority with decree power.  He used this to implement reforms he deemed necessary to 
remain in power, in particular , amending the constitution.     
As to be expected, the Constitution of Ukraine still required revisions to create an 
effective system of checks and balances between the branches of government.  The 
Constitutional Agreement in 1995 began implementation of a checks and balances system 
between the executive and legislative branches, and it provided the president with veto 
power and the Verkhovna Rada with the power to approve or deny the president's council 
of ministers prior to implementation.58  However, "…the division of power between the 
 
58 Taras, Post Communist Presidents, 86 
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president and parliament remained unresolved until the new Constitution of Ukraine was 
adopted on June 28, 1996."59    
B. FREEDOM SCORES MEASURING UKRAINE'S DEMOCRACY UNDER 
LEONID KUCHMA  
Now it is important to look at the Freedom House scores awarded to the Kuchma 
Administration:   
 PR CL Status 
1993 4 4 PF 
1994 3 4 PF 
1995 3 4 PF 
1996 3 4 PF 
1997 3 4 PF 
1998 3 4 PF 
1999 3 4 PF 
2000 4 4 PF 
2001 4 4 PF 
2002 4 4 PF 
2003 4 4 PF 
2004 4 4 PF 
   
Table 3 Freedom House scores during the Kuchma Presidency. (From Ref 60)  
"PR" stands for Political Rights, "CL" stands for Civil Liberties, and "PF" 
stands for partly free.  Freedom House evaluations use a scale of 1-7 with 
1 representing the highest degree of  freedom present, and 7 being the 
lowest level. 60   
As is evident from Table 1, the rating of political rights for Ukraine decreased 
from four to three after President Kuchma had succeeded President Kravchuk in 1994.  
Political rights as defined by Freedom House "...enable people to participate freely in the 
political process, including the right to vote, compete for public office, and elect 
representatives who have a decisive impact on public policies and are accountable to the 
                                                 
59 Bertelsmann Transformation Index Country Report: Ukraine. 2004. http://www.bertelsmann-
transformation-index.de/158.0.html?L=1.  (Accessed 5 December 2005). 
60 Freedom in the World Comparative Rankings 1972-2004.  Database on-line. Available from 
Freedom House.    http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=15&year=2005. (Accessed 1 May 
2006).  
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electorate."61  A lower PR score means that exercise of political rights is becoming freer 
and hence more democratic.  As noted during Kuchma's second term, the PR score rose 
from three to four, thus Ukraine became less free.  Overall, political rights became more 
democratic from Kravchuk to Kuchma in Kuchma's first term, but became less 
democratic in Kuchma's second term.   
C.  BERTELSMANN TRANSFORMATION INDEX COMPARISON 
Another tool of measurement used to examine Ukraine's democratic progress is 
the Bertelsmann Foundation Index.  This is used to discern Ukraine's position in the 
democratic spectrum.  BTI has a checklist of eighteen indicators for democracy.  
Transparency and accountability indicate the actual functioning of formal democratic 
structures.  BTI’s overall score is based on the average of the scores obtained from the 
political transformation study, and will amplify Ukraine's participation in the free and fair 
electoral process. 62  For evaluation purposes, the BTI compares Ukraine's democratic 
transition with three other countries: Hungary, Poland, and Belarus.  These countries 
were chosen as they represent several points of progress on the road to democracy.  For 
example, Hungary held the top ranking country in BTIs Political Transformation index in 
2003. Furthermore, Poland was considered a successful democratically transitioning 
country according to Bertelsmann as well as Taras Kuzio in Ukraine under Kuchma.63 
On the other hand, Belarus represents the authoritarian end of the spectrum as the country 
has unfavorable pre-conditions for a market-based democracy according to Bertelsmann.   
 
61 Freedom of the World Survey Methodology.  Internet on-line. Available from Freedom House, 
http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=35&year=2005. (Accessed 4 December 2005).  
62 The score for "Political Transformation" is obtained by calculating the mean value of the ratings for 
the following criteria: stateness, political participation, rule of law, stability of democratic institutions, and 
political and social integration. A score of 10 is awarded for the best progress toward a market-based 
democracy while a 1 represents the lowest performance.  Internet on-line.  Available from Bertelsmann 
Stiftung, Shaping Change: Strategies of Development and Transformation, http://www.bertelsmann-
transformation-index.de/37.0.html?&L=1.  (Accessed 5 December 2005). 
63 Kuzio, Taras. 1997. Ukraine under Kuchma. New York: St Martin's Press, 3.  
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Country BTI Ranking 
Hungary 9.4 1 
Poland 9.2 7 
Ukraine 7.1 44 
Belarus 3.97 85 
 
Table 4 BTI Political Transformation Indices for Selected Countries64 
 
From Table 4 it is obvious that Ukraine has not completed its transition to 
democracy, but is making substantial progress towards democracy as compared to 
authoritarian Belarus.   
D. ELECTION PITFALLS CLOUDING DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION 
Although BTI scores from 2003 paint an optimistic picture for a transitioning 
democratic Ukraine, certain electoral process maladies affected the earlier Verkhovna 
Rada and presidential elections.  Most importantly, contestation declined as state 
influence in elections prevailed, which reduced freedom and fairness in the electoral 
process.  
1. Contestation Declines as Free Elections Dissolve 
Political parties lacked a substantial citizen support base during the 1994 
Verkhovna Rada and Presidential elections, as many voters were unaware of individual 
party programs.  Parties' support bases was regional and varied in strength throughout the 
country.  "Political parties during this period were divided into four main groups 
consisting of the radical leftist (communist ideologues), center-left/liberal parties, 
national democrats, and the radical right groups (extreme nationalists)."65  The leftist 
political parties were strongly communist, oligarch affiliated and anti-reform. The center 
left/liberal parties touted genuine political and economic sovereignty for Ukraine.  The 
national democrats advocated statist and anti-communist reform.  Finally, the radical 
                                                 
64 2003 Bertelsmann Transformation Index. Database on-line. Available from Bertelsmann Stiftung, 
Shaping Change: Strategies of Development and Transformation,  http://www.bertelsmann-transformation-
index.de/37.0.html?&L=1.  (Accessed 7 June 2006).  
65 Kuzio, Ukraine under Kuchma, 8.  
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right advocated that Ukraine remain autonomous and not revert to Russian control and 
influence.  The radical rightist parties were the least successful, as they could not unify, 
and promoted blatant anti-Semitic and racial programs.66  
 
Ideology Political Party 
Leftist (pro-communist/anti-reform) Communist Party of Ukraine (CPU) 
Socialist Party of Ukraine (SPU) 
Peasant Party of Ukraine (SelPU). 
Center Left/Liberal The Social Democratic Party of Ukraine (SDPU) 
Green Party of Ukraine (UPZ)  
Labor Congress of Ukraine (TKU),  
Liberal Democratic Party of Ukraine (LDPU)  
Liberal Party of Ukraine (LPU,  
The Party of Democratic Revival (PDRU) 
Hromada 
National Democrats Rukh 
Ukrainian Republican Party (URP) 
Democratic Party of Ukraine (DPU).   
Radical Right (extreme nationalist) Ukrainian National Assembly (UNA) 
Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists (KUN) 
Ukrainian State Independence (DSU).    
 
Table 5 Political Parties during the 1994 Verkhovna Elections67 
 
a. The Left Remains Dominant in the Verkhovna Rada in 
1994/1998 Elections 
Not surprisingly, as leftist support increased, the results of the 1994 
Verkhovna Rada elections showed a decrease in the seats occupied by the opposition.  Of 
the 338 seats available, the leftist parties prevailed, gaining 119 seats, the centrist parties 
won 12 seats, the national democrats - 31 seats, and the extreme right secured eight seats.  
The remaining 168 seats were won by independent candidates.  With this shift in power, 
                                                 
66 Kuzio, Ukraine under Kuchma, 10.  
67 Birch, Sarah. 2000. Elections and Democratization in Ukraine. New York: St Martin's Press, 84.  
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Communist views dominated over 50% of the Verkhovna Rada.68 The situation remained 
largely unchanged in the 1998 Verkhovna Rada elections with the leftist parties (CPU 
and SPU) gaining 173 seats, the center left/liberal parties (Hromada, SDPU, and UPZ) 
gaining 102 seats, and the total right (Rukh) gaining 59 seats.69 Additionally, there were 
several instances of abuse of power by public officials in the campaign process.  The 
most obvious was described in the OSCE election report covering the 1998 Verkhovna 
Rada elections when President Kuchma changed electoral law and appointed his Cabinet 
Minister Volodymyr Marchenko, thus replacing the opposition backed Yalta Mayor, 
Oleksandr Kaylus.70  Also observed was media bias, as state television was used to 
promote the oligarchic 'parties of power', chiefly the CPU and SPU.  This strong 
oligarchic party professed nationalist, non-reformist views.  When factoring the pre-
election television coverage, the OSCE reported that "…the party in power received the 
greatest amount of television coverage with 102 minutes.  Other parties received from 56 
minutes to only 7 minutes of coverage."71  Similar media favoritism and state control 
prevailed in the 1994 presidential elections as well. 
b. 1994 Presidential Elections 
The 1994 Presidential election was somewhat different from the 1991 
elections in that candidates did not readily identify with a particular political party, yet 
did represent certain interest groups. Leonid Kravchuk remained a proponent of 
nationalism, while Leonid Kuchma was affiliated with the Inter Regional Bloc of 
Reforms (MRBR), a bloc of liberal democrats who were strongly anti-communist and 
pro-reform. Oleksandr Moroz was associated with the SPU and Volodymyr Lanovyi and 
Valeri Babych were both staunch reformists. Finally, Ivan Plyushch and Petro Talanchuk 
were backed by the 'party of power', which dominated the Verkhovna Rada.  "Of the 
seven candidates who stood only one- Moroz- was a member of a political party." 72   
In the 1991 election, Kravchuk received tremendous support due to his 
nationalistic platform, but after mismanaging the economy, Ukrainians desired greater 
 
68 Birch, Elections and Democratization in Ukraine , 84.    
69 Ibid, 106.  
70 Republic of Ukraine Parliamentary Elections 29 March 1998, Final Report.  Office for Democratic 
Institutions and Human Rights.  (Warsaw, Poland: OSCE, 1999), 17. 
71 Ibid, 19.   
72 Birch, Elections and Democratization in Ukraine , 93.  
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stability. Polarization deepened in the 1994 Presidential election when Kravchuk won 
central and Western oblasts while Kuchma succeeded in the southern and eastern areas of 
Ukraine in the runoff.  In the end, Kuchma won with 52.1% of the popular vote.73  This 
was the first freely contested presidential election.  Kuchma's victory was considered a 
true measure of democracy, according to Dahl.  Previous Soviet elections usually had 
predetermined results and Kuchma had not been expected to win over Kravchuk.74 
 
Candidate First Round (%) Second Round (%) 
Leonid Kravchuk 37.72 45.06 
Leonid Kuchma 31.27 52.14 
Oleksandr Moroz 13.04  
Volodomyr Lanovyi 9.32  
Valeri Babych 2.39  
Ivan Plyushch 1.29  
Petro Talanchuk 0.54  
 
Table 6 Results of the 1994 presidential election75   
While successes were noted in the 1994 elections, the 1999 Presidential 
election deteriorated from free and fair in the first round to coercion and bias in the 
second round.  In this regard, the 1999 presidential election demonstrated a shift away 
from democratic electoral practices seen in the 1994 presidential election.  Several 
discrepancies noted by OSCE observers during the 31 October and 14 November election 
runoffs included: intimidation of state employees by their superiors to vote for the 
incumbent, Leonid Kuchma; unfair campaigning practices displayed by the media, giving 
Kuchma an unfair advantage over opposition candidates; multiple voting; and 
incompetence by election committees.76  The Central Election Committee (CEC), which 
oversaw the entire electoral process, had weak authority and failed to enforce election 
campaign regulations.   
In order to understand where the breakdown occurred in the 1999 
elections, it is important to understand the workings of elections in Ukraine. Presidential 
                                                 
73 Arel, Dominique and Andrew Wilson, "Ukraine under Kuchma: Back to Eurasia," RFE/RL 
Research Report 3, no. 32 (1994), 1. 
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elections in Ukraine are conducted by a three-layered hierarchy within the Electoral 
Administration.  It is composed of the Central Election Committee (CEC), Territorial 
Election Committee (TEC) and the Polling Station Committee (PSC), in federal to local 
order.  Parliament or other local bodies appoint members to establish these organizations.  
CEC members are nominated by the President and appointed by the Verkhovna Rada.  
Then, the committees at each level oversee the administration and ensure the electoral 
rights of citizens are followed via the protocol established by the Constitution and Laws 
of Ukraine.  Unfortunately, during the 1999 Presidential elections, there was some 
measure of corruption at each level that prevented accurate election processes.  One 
example was at the CEC, which was unable to enforce campaign regulations.77    
As the CEC was grossly incompetent in enforcing campaign regulations, 
problems occurred at the lower echelons as well, particularly the TEC.  The TEC is an 
integral part of the election process as the commission is responsible for 
"…administering elections within respective territories, hearing complaints, and appeals 
regarding the actions at lower election commissions."78  President Kuchma had 
disproportionate TEC representation at each oblast, specifically a 35 % share of the 
chairs.  His closest competition was Petro Simonenko of the CPU with 8.7% 
representation of TEC chairs. 79  Having a pro-Kuchma TEC violated protocol of what 
the optimal TEC structure should entail and gave the perception that electoral hierarchy 
at the TEC level was biased.  Kuchma had substantially more TEC Chairmen than any 
other candidate.  Moreover, his TECs dominated areas where he had lost popular support 
previously in the 1998 parliamentary elections.80 It was obvious that Kuchma was 
weighting the districts in his favor to ensure electoral victory, a technique that manifested 
his personal desire for state control.      
The TEC was not the only corrupt level of the Electoral Administration. 
Kuchma also orchestrated representation majority at the PSC level increasing perceptions 
that the vote count could be manipulated in local settlements.  He secured the highest 
number of representatives, 58,904 (14.9%) and Moroz a distant second with 48,577 
 
77 Ukraine Presidential Elections 31 October and 14 November 1999, Final Report, 5.   
78 Ibid.  
79 Ibid, 6.  
80 Ibid.    
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(12.3%).81  Across the country, President Kuchma achieved plurality of the PSC's leading 
positions, which was clearly visible to OSCE observers on election day.   
Besides gaining the majority of support within the electoral 
administration, the state strongly backed Kuchma, as evidenced by the conduct displayed 
toward the opposition.  The opposition bank of candidates was restricted during their 
respective campaigns.  "The OSCE Election Observer Mission (EOM) received 90 
complaints from opposition candidates and activists that their ability to campaign freely 
was restricted through personal threats, removal of campaign material, and obstruction of 
campaign meetings.  State institutions and their employees were deemed the cause." 82    
In addition to bullying the opposition, the citizenry also felt pressure from 
the state.  Coercion was a tactic used by the state to keep President Kuchma in office by 
guaranteeing him the election.  For example, during the election proceedings, teachers 
supervised their voting students and hospital administrators supervised their employees.  
In addition, teachers were required to disseminate pro-Kuchma campaign material and 
were dismissed if they refused.83  
Another example of corruption included electronic media coverage.  The 
1999 Presidential election was biased from a media perspective in that Kuchma received 
a majority of television coverage, and the opposition received far less exposure.  
Meetings conducted by the EOM from September through November with local 
television senior executives revealed that Kuchma received 70 minutes of coverage on 
Ukraine Television 1 (UT 1) with his opponent Petro Symonenko (CPU) "…receiving 
only 11 minutes in two weeks. The content was overwhelming positive for the President 
and negative for Symonenko."84 Kuchma was able to manipulate UT 1 as it was a state 
run television channel.  It was obvious that free media in the democratic elections were 
subordinate to Kuchma's political goals.  
The 1999 elections were corrupt for several reasons, including 
intervention of the state in election proceedings and media bias.  Despite the fact that the 
 
81 Ukraine Presidential Elections 31 October and 14 November 1999, Final Report , 7.  
82 Ibid, , 15.   
83 Ibid, 17.  
84 Ukraine Presidential Elections 31 October and 14 November 1999, Final Report , 17.  
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Verkhovna Rada formed the electoral commission, the presidential incumbent still 
manipulated it.  Free and fair voting practices were non-existent as citizens were coerced 
by the state.  Additionally, the media did not favorably portray opposition candidates.  
Ukrainians had fewer political rights under Kuchma according to Freedom House, an 
evaluation reinforced by ODIHR election findings.  Elections were moving away from a 
free and fair environment to one of state bias and control.  Finally, voter confidence in the 
electoral process plummeted "…with over two-thirds (68%) expecting the elections to be 
fraudulent."85 The electoral process was migrating away from this democratic criterion 
under the Kuchma administration.   
2. Kuchma's Political Agenda and Return to Authoritarianism 
Under Kuchma, Ukraine was moving towards authoritarianism in that Kuchma 
did not act in the constituency's interests and he was overly consumed with 
circumventing the Verkhovna Rada's legislative power.  Kuchma's motives were driven 
by his desire to remain in power rather than the desires of the citizenry.  In fact, Kuchma 
often changed his campaign strategy to remain in office by tailoring his platform to the 
popular interests of the people at that specific point in time.  A considerable portion of 
the electorate believed that Ukraine's economy could be saved only through stronger 
Russian relations after independence in 1991.86  Thus, the national interest was somewhat 
divided between Ukrainian nationalism and improved relations with Russia.   Therefore, 
his platform in 1994 was based on closer economic relations with Russia and intentions 
to implement economic reforms.  These views were hardly within the constituency's 
views in the Western and the Northern oblasts of Ukraine, which viewed a return to 
Russia as a threat to Ukrainian sovereignty.  Moreover, Kuchma was not easily 
influenced by outside actor's interests, specifically the Russian Federation or the 
Ukrainian oligarchs.  Kuchma did seek a return to Russia purely for economic salvation 
as Kravchuk's visions of nationalism and economic mismanagement had eroded Russian-
Ukrainian relations and sent the country into economic ruin and staggering 
hyperinflation.  Kuchma's personal relations with Russian President Boris Yeltsin were 
sour during his first term, but later thawed as the two leaders agreed upon the final status 
 
85 Ukraine Presidential Elections 31 October and 14 November 1999, Final Report , 24.  
86 Birch, Elections and Democratization in Ukraine, 93.  
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of the Black Sea Fleet and were able to sign the Friendship and Cooperation Treaty in 
May 1997.87  Kuchma was not susceptible either to Russian influence or the emerging 
Ukrainian oligarchs. .  
President Kuchma was initially hard on the oligarchic clans of Donets'k (coal 
industry), Donbas (media industry), and Dnipropetrovs'k (steel/gas/defense industry). 
Kuchma later acted as more of a mediator between them, and did not side with one in 
particular.  In the mid 1990s, Kuchma prosecuted Ihor Baikai, a successful commodities 
trader in the gas industry and media oligarch Vadim Rabinovich.  The third oligarch of 
the period, Yukhum Zviahilskiy, of the Donets'k clan, fell out of favor with the Kuchma 
regime.  After a year of energy reforms, the old oligarchs returned to Kuchma's favor 
allowing newer oligarchs to emerge, the owners of steel mills, with the aid of the Prime 
Minster Viktor Yushchenko's legislative reform.  Enacting legislation that reduced 
subsidies to Ukrainian gas traders by Russia and holding Ukrainian gas oligarchs 
accountable to pay for their deliveries, Yushchenko had effectively neutralized the old 
oligarchic system. 88 Yushchenko had "…transformed the oligarchs from rent seekers to 
producers."89 These actions would eventually cost Yushchenko as he was ousted as 
Prime Minister in 2001 by oligarchic influence.  The oligarchs' influence at the end of the 
Kuchma era increased dramatically from their meager beginnings in 1994.   
The newly emerging oligarchs of the steel industry were equally as influential as 
the old gas oligarchs.  Rinat Akhmetov, leader of Ukraine's Donbas regional clan, was 
Ukraine's richest oligarch with an estimated fortune of $2.4 billion gained through his 
company, Systems Capital Management (SCM).  SCM controlled large steel and mining 
companies in Eastern Ukraine.  Viktor Pinchuk, head of the Dnipropetrovs'k clan, was 
the second richest businessman in Ukraine, member of the Verkhovna Rada, and owned 
the ICTV television company.  Pavlo Lasarenko, Dnipropetrovs'k governor and head of 
Unified Energy System of Ukraine, traded heavily in the gas industry with his close 
business partner, Yulia Tymoshenko.  Despite the fact that Yulia Tymoshenko was a 
 
87 "Russia and the CIS; Russia's Non-Strategy for Relations with Ukraine," Johnson's Russia List, 15 
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powerful oligarch in the gas industry in the early 1990s, she was later appointed as 
deputy prime minister in 1999 and became a formidable opponent to the remaining 
oligarchs.90 
Initially the oligarchs were relatively weak in the mid 1990s, but later grew 
increasingly powerful once they were back in Kuchma's good graces.  During Kuchma's 
second term, the oligarchs became more established and sought to prevent democratic 
reform and economic liberalization because transparency would endanger their profits 
and power  The oligarchs did not influence Kuchma because they were still a relatively 
weak political entity.  The centrists were too unorganized to transform themselves into 
oligarchs during Kuchma's first term; therefore, this class did not influence Kuchma's 
presidential power.91  In addition, the oligarchs’ goals aligned with Kuchma's goals--to 
avoid becoming the weaker opposition.  Kuchma never really saw the oligarchs as a true 
threat; otherwise, he would have enacted legislation to protect himself if he feared he 
were being usurped.92  As President Kuchma drove his own agenda and was not 
influenced by internal domestic politics, the oligarchs, he fell short in Diamond's trait of a 
liberal democracy--elected officials who represent their respective constituents.  
Although outside actors did not influence Kuchma, he did not necessarily represent the 
will of the majority in Ukraine.   
3. Executive Power Circumvents the Constitution 
During a period known for democratic regression and a shift toward 
authoritarianism, Leonid Kuchma went to great lengths to strengthen the powers of the 
president and wrest power away from the Verkhovna Rada.  Kuchma certainly used his 
power of decrees more than Kravchuk to execute economic and government reforms.  For 
example, Kuchma averaged 1200 decrees per year during his presidency, while Kravchuk 
averaged 600.93  In addition to Kuchma's flagrant use of decree power, the Constitution 
was amended granting him additional powers.   
 
90 Åslund and McFaul, Revolution in orange: The origins of Ukraine's democratic breakthrough, 13-
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The Constitution of Ukraine would undergo several sweeping changes during the 
Kuchma administration until the final approved version in June 1996.   The previous 
Constitution under Kravchuk was still representative of the leftover Soviet Constitution 
from 1978 in several regards because it still did not clearly differentiate power between 
executive, judicial and legislative branches.  As a result, the Verkhovna Rada and the 
president still "…shared and contested executive and legislative power."94  Leonid 
Kuchma would press the Verkhovna Rada continually for a draft constitution defining the 
powers of the legislative and the executive branches of government, but the factionalized 
parliament was unable to come to terms quickly. Conflicts arose concerning the issues of 
separation of power, state symbols and national language.  In the end, the Verkhovna 
Rada could not agree on several aspects of the constitutional framework, one of which 
was defining the powers of the president.95 
The Constitutional Agreement of 1995 was an interim Constitution, which 
governed the branches of government until an actual constitution could be signed.  Under 
this agreement, Kuchma received greater power over the Verkhovna Rada in the areas of 
Cabinet of Ministers organization and management (Article 24), presidential 
representatives at each successive Rada level (Article 19), and veto power over the 
Verkhovna Rada laws (Article 23).96 Under this agreement, Kuchma gained control over 
the Prime Minster and Cabinet of Ministers.  Formerly, under the SSR Constitution of 
1978, the Verkhovna Rada held this function.  Additionally, Kuchma gained veto power.  
Although the Verkhovna Rada could overrule Kuchma's veto with two-thirds majority, 
this was rarely achieved in the highly factionalized Rada.97  The Constitutional 
Agreement of 1995 would set the stage for Kuchma's brand of authoritarianism to 
flourish, leading Ukraine away from democracy.  During the Kuchma administration, 
presidential powers were increased and the Verkhovna Rada powers lessened as the 
legislative branch became subordinate to the executive branch.  Kuchma gained power 
using his system of presidential appointment to rule by decree, "…allowing him control 
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over lucrative positions that provided access to state resources.  Kuchma used blackmail 
and bribes in manipulating parliament and the government." 98  In addition, as the 
judiciary was expected to follow the orders of the politicians in power, it was unable to 
check and balance the legislative and executive branches.  Often used in a functioning 
and successful democracy, the judiciary was minimized under Kuchma.  As a result 
policymakers in the presidential administration "…increasingly interfered in the work of 
the judiciary during the Kuchma presidency."99   
Surprisingly, democratic progress was attained with the ratification of the 1996 
Constitution, under Kuchma.  Providing for a complete separation of powers between the 
executive and legislative branches of government, it allowed the president "…to issue 
decrees, veto laws passed by parliament, and introduce draft laws that would have 
priority status for the Verkhovna Rada's consideration."100  However, enforcing the 
constitution would prove difficult for the parliament.  Extensive use of the veto 
characterized Kuchma's presidency, and was rarely overridden by the Verkhovna Rada.  
Only when Kuchma attempted to increase his executive power through further 
constitutional amendments in 2000 and 2003 did the Verkhovna Rada achieve solidarity 
and block his pursuits.101  Additional Constitutional amendments passed in December 
2004 granted the Verkhovna Rada extended powers, and balanced powers between the 
executive and legislative branches.  Critics believe Kuchma enacted these amendments 
not because he wanted Ukraine to become more democratic but because he could not find 
a successor who would carry on his initiatives; obviously he feared personal and political 
repercussions.102  Regardless of Kuchma's intent, the constitutional amendments passed 
in 2004 balanced power between the executive and legislative branches and were a step 
in the right direction toward democratic transition.      
E. CONCLUSIONS 
Ukraine had the potential to continue transitioning forward to democracy at the 
beginning of Kuchma's first term, yet his actions during his second term regressed the 
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country along the democratic spectrum.  According to Freedom House scores, Ukraine 
became freer under Kuchma in his first term, yet later regressed to less free during his 
second term.   
Ukraine became less of a polyarchy under Kuchma than Kravchuk.  A polyarchy 
is a specific type of democracy in that it is concerned more with the electoral process, 
particularly increasing voter participation as well as the presence of an opposition to the 
majority.  Although the 1994 presidential elections showed a greater level of public 
contestation signifying potential progress toward democracy, the 1999 elections were 
grossly corrupt and biased towards the incumbent. Moreover, public contestation 
degraded in the 1994 and 1999 Verkhovna Rada elections as the CPU retained 
parliamentary dominance.  Ukraine became "less free" in political rights, as the ODIHR 
evaluation noted.  Voters were coerced, the opposition was not given the same media 
coverage as the incumbent, and Kuchma heavily influenced the electoral process in his 
favor.  
According to Diamond's first element of a liberal democracy where elected 
officials are accountable to the citizenry, Ukraine regressed in the democratic spectrum 
under Kuchma.  President Kuchma's power as an elected official was not authentic and 
reflective of his constituency's interests, yet he was not controlled by the whims of the 
oligarchs or Russian President Yeltsin.  The oligarchs were too weak to oppose him and 
infiltrated the Verkhovna Rada merely to protect their own business interests.  Kuchma 
developed closer ties to Russia during his terms merely to protect the interests of 
Ukraine, and he played outside actors against one another.  Although he was not 
influenced by outside actors' interests, as was former President Kravchuk, Kuchma's 
intentions were driven by his desires to remain in office.  According to this criterion of 
democracy, Ukraine was not making forward progress as its elected leaders did not act in 
the interests of the citizenry.   
In Diamond's second criteria of a liberal democracy where the constitution 
regulated power amongst government branches, Ukraine ultimately improved in the 
democratic spectrum under Kuchma than under Kravchuk. While executive power was 
neither constrained constitutionally nor held accountable by other government branches 
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under Kuchma in his first term, later constitutional amendments restored equilibrium 
between the branches of government in his second term.  The 1996 Constitution was a 
step towards democracy in that it provided for a complete separation of powers between 
president and parliament and clearly defined presidential powers. .     
Ultimately, Ukraine seemed to be sliding backward to authoritarianism under 
Kuchma.  Under Kuchma, the most important criterion of democracy, that of a free and 
fair electoral process, was absent in all elections during this period.  Elected officials' 
power grew consistently less genuine both in the presidency with Kuchma's quest for 
legislative power and decree abuse as well as in the Verkhovna Rada with the infiltrating 
oligarchs. Conversely, there was a positive move toward democracy, as the 1996 
Constitution of Ukraine eventually curtailed executive power. Further amendments in 
2004 granted some presidential powers to the Verkhovna Rada.   
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IV. THE ORANGE REVOLUTION AND VIKTOR 
YUSHCHENKO'S VISION 
As the Orange Revolution reminds us, elections are critical to democracy's 
existence not because they affirm it, but because they call it into 
question.103 
A. VIKTOR YUSHCHENKO (DECEMBER 2004-PRESENT) 
Within the past two years, there has been a shift in the electoral process of 
Ukraine after the Orange Revolution towards free and fair elections. Taking the form of a 
series of peaceful protests across Ukraine, the Orange Revolution took place in response 
to the perceived electoral fraud that occurred in the 2004 presidential election between 
Viktor Yanukovych and the opposition candidate Viktor Yushchenko.  Yushchenko's 
party, "Our Ukraine,” mobilized peaceful popular protests against perceived election 
fraud culminating in the Supreme Court's decision that the second election round was 
invalid and must be repeated.  The political majority's will prevailed in the Orange 
Revolution and has set Ukraine on the path toward a free and fair election process 
indicative of a democracy.    
The election of Viktor Yanukovych after the second round of elections on 21 
November raised questions regarding Ukraine's free and fair electoral process.  If Ukraine 
was a democracy, proclaiming it had free and fair elections, why did the Orange 
Revolution occur, removing Viktor Yanukovich from the office of President?  Can 
democracy be sustained in Ukraine? This chapter seeks answers to these questions. 
Although the Orange Revolution was successful in reversing state-biased elections, 
Ukraine must avoid the tendency to default to its past corrupt electoral practices and 
suppression of the opposition.  Furthermore, the dominance in the Verkhovna Rada of 
Viktor Yanukovych's Regions Party in March 2006 has the potential to further galvanize 
the rift between the east and the west.  Regrettably, Ukraine has fallen short on 
democratic reforms evident with past electoral fraud, the attempted assassination of 
Yushchenko, and leftist views in Southern and Eastern Ukraine.  
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B. FREEDOM SCORES MEASURING UKRAINE'S DEMOCRACY UNDER 
VIKTOR YUSHCHENKO 
When analyzing Yushchenko’s administration, it is important to study on the 
Freedom House scores regarding democracy in Ukraine:   
2005 2006 
PR CL Status PR CL Status 
4 3 PF 3 2 F 
 
Table 7 Freedom House scores during the Yushchenko presidency. (From Ref 104)  
"PR" stands for Political Rights, "CL" stands for Civil Liberties, and "PF" 
stands for partly free.  Freedom House evaluations use a scale of 1-7 with 
1 representing the highest degree of  freedom present, and 7 being the 
lowest level. 104  
Comparing Tables 1 and 7, it is evident that Ukraine's PR scores move from four 
to three during Yushchenko's presidential term, signifying that Ukrainians had more 
political rights.  This shift occurred because many citizens throughout the country 
mobilized against the fraudulent second round in the 2004 presidential election.  
Additionally the country's freedom status improved from "partly free" in 2005 to "free" in 
2006.   Unfair electoral practices were neutralized with the Orange Revolution.   Prior to 
the Orange Revolution, elections had followed the same dismal trends they had in the 
past, including the state’s coercion of voters, a biased media and corrupt electoral 
accounting procedures, as evidenced by the OSCE evaluation of the 1999 presidential 
election.     
1. Presidential election of 2004 and the Verkhovna Rada Elections in 
2006: Different Beginnings, Similar Outcomes 
Freedom House statistics depict an increase in political rights from Kuchma's to 
Yushchenko's presidency, due in part to the successful outcome of the Orange 
Revolution.  This is illustrated by OSCE election results as well as the democratic 
Verkhovna Rada elections in 2006.  While the ODIHR findings painted a bleak picture 
after the first presidential election round  in 2004, substantial progress was made toward 
democracy after the influence of nonviolent peaceful protest.  Inefficient and corrupt 
                                                 
104 Freedom in the World Rankings.  2006. Database on-line. Available from Freedom House.    
http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=15&year=2005. (Accessed 1 May 2006).   
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election committees were replaced, and control of the media relaxed, creating a more 
competitive political environment.  In addition, state bias and control faded, as the repeat 
second round runoff occurred.  For example, during the 2006 Verkhovna Rada elections, 
contestants actually received equal coverage on the state run television channel, UT1.105  
Moreover, the Supreme Court was more effective than in previous presidential elections, 
as it annulled fraudulent election results.  For instance, "…on 3 December 2004, the 
Supreme Court decided to invalidate the decision of the CEC… and ruled that in order to 
restore the rights of the election participants, the second round must be repeated." 106    
Finally, elections were moving toward a freer and fairer climate.   
a. Unfair Second Round Presidential Elections Mobilize Opposition 
While multiple political parties were represented during the 2004 
presidential election, it was not equitable.  The lineup consisted of Viktor Yanukovych 
(Party of Regions), Viktor Yushchenko (Our Ukraine/Yulia Tymoshenko bloc), Petro 
Symonenko (Communist Party), and Oleksandr Moroz (Socialist Party).  In addition, 
although there were a variety of political parties represented, the first round of elections 
was controlled by state intervention and media bias.     
Ideology Political Party 
Leftist (pro-communist/anti-reform) Communist Party of Ukraine (CPU) 
Party of Regions 
Socialist Party of Ukraine (SPU) 
Liberal/Nationalist (pro-west, pro democracy) Our Ukraine Bloc 
Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc 
 
Table 8 Dominant Political Parties in the 2004 Presidential Elections107 
 
Both rounds of the 2004 presidential election mirrored the 1999 
presidential election, yielding similar ODIHR findings of Central Election Committee 
(CEC) ineptitude and apathy, media bias, and state intervention.  In review, a three-
                                                 
105 Report of the International Election Observation Mission, Parliamentary Elections, Ukraine-26 
March 2006.  Office of Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, (Warsaw, Poland: OSCE, 2006), 10. 
106 Ukraine Presidential Election 31 October, 21 November, and 26 December 2004, OSCE/ODIHR 
Election Observation Mission Final Report.  Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, 
(Warsaw, Poland: OSCE, 2005). Database on-line. Available from OSCE, http://www.osce.org/odihr-
elections/14667.html. (Accessed 19  May 2006), 3.  
107 Central Election Commission.  Internet on-line, Available from www.cvk.gov.ua. (Accessed 9 
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layered hierarchy within the Electoral Administration composed of the Central Election 
Committee (CEC), Territorial Election Committee (TEC) and the Polling Station 
Committee (PSC), conducted presidential elections in Ukraine.  Unfortunately, the 
electoral hierarchy was biased and incompetent, especially at the CEC level.  The state 
often levied support toward the incumbent's choice, Viktor Yanukovych, while reducing 
support to the opposition candidates.  One example was that the media coverage focused 
on the state's candidate while the opposition received minimal or unfavorable coverage.  
Additionally, the state influenced Ukrainian citizens to support Yanukovych All of the 
above transgressions were the catalyst for the Orange Revolution.  The citizens of 
Ukraine were incensed by the perceived fraudulent second round election results in the 
2004 presidential elections.  "International observers roundly denounced the election as 
rigged; and when Yanukovych emerged as the official winner with a lead of three 
percentage points, hundreds of thousands of people descended onto the streets to contest 
the election's official results."108  
 Yushchenko Yanukovych 
First Round (31 October) 39.9 % 39.26% 
Second Round (21 November) 46.61% 49.46% 




Table 9 2004 Ukraine Presidential election results109 
The election hierarchy of 2004 remained inefficient, much as it did during 
the 1999 presidential elections, greatly hindering the concept of a free and fair electoral 
process.   In the first round, the CEC performed as dismally in 2004 as it did during the 
1999 elections.  For instance, the 2004 CEC was not transparent or politically neutral in 
the electoral process and was reluctant to enforce electoral law or take action against 
improper administrative decisions.  The CEC failed to properly maintain order and 
supervise the Territorial Election Committee (TEC), resulting in the TEC's inconsistent 
and selective application of election law.  Furthermore, the CEC failed to establish 
transparent and accountable procedures for use of Absentee Voter Certificates (AVCs), 
                                                 
108 Ascher, "Deciding on the Borderland: The Ukrainian Elections of 2004," 2. 
109 Ukraine Presidential Election 31 October, 21 November, and 26 December 2004, OSCE/ODIHR 
Election Observation Mission Final Report, 45.  
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which lead to instances of multiple voting.110  Finally, the CEC did not take any punitive 
action against filed complaints.  Due to these flagrant violations and the mismanagement 
of lower echelons in the first election round, the Verkhovna Rada dismissed the first 
round CEC and appointed a new committee.  "This newly appointed CEC addressed 
previous OSCE Election Observer Mission (EOM) recommendations and administered 
the repeat second round runoff of the 2004 presidential election in a more transparent and 
accountable fashion."111  Slowly the electoral process was repaired through the ODIHR's 
heavy handedness, but deeply rooted bias and state control within the system impeded the 
democratic election process in early 2004.     
Unfortunately, actions at the lower echelons of the electoral committee, 
specifically the (TEC) and Polling Station Committee (PSC), were equally abysmal.  
There were reports of unfair support in favor of Yanukovych, as the TEC selection was 
prejudicial, much as it was during the 1999 presidential election.  The TEC’s lacked 
independence from local government structures, which were influenced by the incumbent 
Prime Minister, Yanukovych.  In the end, Yushchenko's TEC representatives experienced 
a high degree of discrimination and were often shut out of TEC meetings.112  
The PSC faced several hurdles simply in conducting the business of 
decision-making.  "According to the law, an election commission can function only when 
two-thirds of its appointed members are present at a session."113  Because of this 
stipulation, many PSC members, regardless of political affiliation, simply chose 
resignation or absence to stifle the committee's actions.  One instance was in early 
October when a large number of appointed PSC members resigned or failed to take up 
their duties, thus hamstringing the PSC's ability to tally first-round election results.114  
Additionally, PSC selection was biased and favored Yanukovych in several districts.  
Local government structures favored Yanukovych and dismissed many PSC members 
appointed by the opposition prior to the first and second election rounds.  
 
110 Ukraine Presidential Election 31 October, 21 November, and 26 December 2004, OSCE/ODIHR 
Election Observation Mission Final Report, 9.  
111 Ibid, 2.  
112 Ibid, 12. 
113 Ibid, 13.  
114 Ibid, 2.  
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The first round of the 2004 presidential elections were not considered 
"free" in terms of either equal media coverage or lack of state control.  The incumbent 
president, Leonid Kuchma largely controlled the State-run national television channel 
UT1, and regularly used the channel's extensive coverage to influence voters toward the 
Yanukovych camp.  In addition, UT1 openly promoted Mr. Yanukovych and reported 
critically on Mr. Yushchenko.115  During the second round runoff, the state enforced 
media guidelines, known as temnyky, were removed which had a balancing effect on the 
candidates' media coverage. 116  Ukrainian media actually became fair, no doubt due to 
the effects of the successful peaceful protests.  Citizens became more confident in 
asserting their rights after the Orange Revolution prevailed over election fraud. 
Despite the fact that state control of the media loosened following the 
Orange Revolution, there was still coercive backlash from the top levels of government in 
the first election round, harkening back to the 1999 presidential election.  For instance, 
the state enacted measures to quell voter support of the opposition and channel it toward 
Yanukovych.  Leading up to the first election round on 31 October 2004, the state 
ordered students and public sector employees to sign Yanukovych's candidate petition 
and vote in his favor or face adverse consequences.  Additionally, the state exerted 
pressure on citizens to cease their political activity for opposition candidates.  "In 
Zhytomyr, OSCE observers reported that senior university staff instructed teachers and 
students that an upcoming international peace function event was mandatory; when 
students arrived however, the event turned out to be a Yanukovych campaign rally."117  
b. The Verkhovna Rada Elections in 2006 Earn ODIHR Accolades 
The 2006 Verkhovna Rada elections were vastly different from past 
elections in Ukraine in that there was a competent CEC to execute free and fair electoral 
practices and an absence of state intervention and media bias.  There was wide 
participation of parties and blocs representative of the entire political spectrum of 
Ukraine. These positive characteristics of Ukraine's electoral process had been largely 
absent in past elections.  Yushchenko conducted himself far differently than Kuchma 
 
115 Ukraine Presidential Election 31 October, 21 November, and 26 December 2004, OSCE/ODIHR 
Election Observation Mission Final Report, 13.  
116 Ibid, 2.  
117 Ukraine Presidential Election 31 October, 21 November, and 26 December 2004, OSCE/ODIHR 
Election Observation Mission Final Report , 18.  
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concerning media bias and party coverage.  "The State-funded television channel, UT1, 
complied with its legal obligation to provide free time for all contestants … and devoted 
a significant portion of its main news program to activities of the president which were 
largely neutral and positive in tone." 118  These elections appeared to be truly democratic 
and unhindered by the state, a dramatic transformation from previous elections.   
Political Party Gained seats Vote (%) 
Party of Regions 186 32.1 
Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc 129 22.9 
Our Ukraine Bloc 81 13.9 
Socialist Party of Ukraine 33 5.6 
Communist Party of Ukraine 21 3.66 
 
Table 10 Results of the 2006 Verkhovna Rada elections.119 
 
2. The Oligarch's Occasional Hand of Influence 
There has been a certain degree of variation in each Ukrainian president's use of 
power.  Kravchuk was wary of using it lest he incite a rift between himself and the 
opposition or the majority.  On the other hand, Kuchma thirsted for power and 
compromised ethical governing practices to acquire it.  And current President Viktor 
Yushchenko uses his constitutionally diminished powers cautiously, as the oligarchs 
ousted him as Prime Minister in 2001.120  He has attempted a hard-line stance towards 
the oligarchs and has had considerable success in limiting oligarchic capitalism, yet 
Yushchenko appears to be influenced by oligarchs on other issues.  President Kuchma 
was largely responsible for the rise of the oligarchs, as they were allowed economic 
freedom in Ukraine under Kuchma's second term.    Kuchma did little to stifle them and 
allowed questionable privatization ventures to proceed.  Eventually the oligarchs 
infiltrated the Verkhovna Rada where they were eventually able to influence 
                                                 
118  Report of the International Election Observation Mission, Parliamentary Elections, Ukraine-26 
March 2006, 10.  
119 The election of people's deputies.  2006.  Database on line. Available from the Central Election 
Commission of Ukraine.  http://www.cvk.gov.ua/vnd2006/w6p001e.html.   (Accessed 15 May 2006).  
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government.121  Dmitri Vydrin, the director of the European Integration and 
Development Institute in Kyiv was quoted as saying, "When you look at what is 
happening in Parliament, you see too many factions, which are still being influenced by 
big business.  Yushchenko's Ukraine is a pseudo-democracy much as it was when he took 
office, where the rules of political competition are not transparent, and still influenced by 
oligarch interests."122    In the aftermath of the Orange Revolution, the oligarchs have 
continued to reign supreme within the Verkhovna Rada.  
 President Yushchenko promises fair market practices and has shown an 
ability to curb the oligarchs and set a precedent.  Yet, he has acted differently in two 
separate issues concerning Kryvorizhstal and the murder case of Heorhiy Gongadze. This 
is perhaps due to the assassination attempt on his life by dioxin poisoning in 2004 by 
anti-oppositionists.123 Yushchenko was successful in reversing the 2004 Kryvorizhstal 
steel mill privatization venture by System Capital Management, a company owned by 
Ukrainian billionaire Rinat Akhmetov, and Interpipe, a company of Viktor Pinchuk 
(oligarch and brother-in-law of former President Kuchma).  Kryvorizhstal Steel was 
privatized by these two oligarchs in 2004 for the bargain price of $800 million USD in 
2004.  This low price caused a scandal as Kryvorizhstal Steel's market value was six 
times as much as SCM and Interpipe paid for it. 124   "Court rulings later struck down the 
2004 sale, and the steel mill was returned to the state in June 2005."125  Although this 
was a victory for Yushchenko over the oligarchs, he has acted far differently in the 
murder trial of opposition journalist Heorhiy Gongadze.    
There has been little progress in the murder case of opposition journalist 
leader Heorhiy Gongadze, where former president Kuchma was allegedly involved.  "The 
 
121 Dempsey, Judy, "Ukraine's dance of the oligarchs," International Herald Tribune, 23 December 
2005. Internet on-line. Available from International Herald Tribune/Business, 
http://www.iht.com/articles/2005/12/23/business/wbolig.php.  (Accessed 10 May 2006).   
122 Steele, Jonathan, "Orange Revolution oligarchs reveal their true colors.", The Guardian, 14 
October 2005.  Internet on-line. Available from Guardian Unlimited, 
http:\\www.guardian.co.uk/comment/story/0,,1591775,00.html.  (Accessed 6  May 2006), 2. 
123 Loof, Susanna, "Yushchenko Poisoned With Dioxin,"Asssociated Press Online, 11 December 
2004.  Available from Associated Press, http://www.mindfully.org/Pesticide/2004/Ukrainian-Yushchenko-
Dioxin11dec04.htm. (Accessed 12 Jun 2006).  
124 "Ukraine: Country's Largest Steel Mill Sold At Auction," Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty 
Online, 24 October 2005.  Available from RFE/RL, http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2005/10/b87465a5-
eb07-48b0-baea-5e60f46f54a8.html. (Accessed 2 June 2006).   
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alleged killers, three police officers, are in jail, but the trial is not going forward.  Senior 
figures from the Kuchma days who are alleged to have ordered the crime and are still 
useful in shoring up Yushchenko's power, remain at large."126  If President Yushchenko 
truly held genuine power reflective of the citizenry, he would act decisively on this issue.  
Although Yushchenko acted in the middle-class business owners’ interests with his 
action in Kryvorizhstal, Yushchenko's inaction in the Gongadze murder trial discredits 
the interests of the opposition.  Yushchenko has been reluctant to wholly attack the 
oligarchs, fearing that aggressive "search and destroy" tactics will trigger a return to 
authoritarianism.  His hesitance only incites oligarchic capitalism and corruption in 
Ukraine.   
3. Constitution of Ukraine Retains Yushchenko's Executive Power 
President Yushchenko's political aims are far different from former President 
Kuchma's in that Yushchenko is not consumed with retaining presidential power.  In 
contrast to Kuchma's return to authoritarianism, Yushchenko genuinely favors 
democratic change and political reform.  Nearing the end of his presidency in 2004, 
Kuchma proposed several amendments to the Constitution of Ukraine limiting his power 
as president and granting more power to the Verkhovna Rada.  Most likely Kuchma 
proposed these amendments because he was unable to ensure the succession of a 
candidate who would continue his policies.127  Kuchma saw the future of Ukraine leaning 
toward an opposition majority.  However, whatever Kuchma's intentions, they produced a 
sense of democracy within Ukraine with the reduction of the president's power.  Viktor 
Yushchenko has done nothing to reverse the constitutional amendments that have limited 
his power, and stated in a television interview that he would do nothing destructive to the 
constitutional initiative adopted by the Verkhovna Rada, referring to the constitutional 
changes approved late last year.128   . 
Interestingly, presidential power under Viktor Yushchenko has diminished.  In his 
term, Yushchenko has seen much of his presidential powers passed to the Verkhovna 
Rada, signifying a balance of power among the governmental branches, indicative of 
 
126 Steele, Jonathan. "Orange Revolution oligarchs reveal their true colors", 3. 
127 Prostyk, "Constitutional Politics and Presidential Power under Leonid Kuchma," 26.  
128 "Ukraine head promises reform move," British Broadcasting Corporation, 4 October 2005.  
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democratic governments. 129 As Yushchenko has relinquished certain powers of the 
office of president, there is growing evidence that the Verkhovna Rada is now as power 
hungry as Kuchma.  For example, the constitutional amendments agreed upon during the 
Orange Revolution, effective 1 January 2006, stripped the president of the power to 
nominate the Prime Minster and form the cabinet.  These changes were hidden from the 
people--instituted without a national referendum--and Yushchenko believed them to be 
unconstitutional. 130 Yushchenko has weakly challenged these constitutional changes and 
seeks to overcome a potential rebellion in the Verkhovna Rada.  No longer a highly 
divided body, as during the Kuchma administration, the Verkhovna Rada has become 
united and a potential obstacle to Viktor Yushchenko's initiatives in the aftermath of the 
2006 Verkhovna Rada elections.  Election results pushed Yushchenko's party, "Our 
Ukraine,” into the minority while former presidential candidate Yanukovych's Party of 
Regions achieved a parliamentary majority.131   The relationship between the president 
and the Verkhovna Rada has democratically evolved as power has shifted until 
equilibrium was finally reached due to the terms set in the present constitution.  The 
ratification of the post-Orange Revolution Constitution in January 2006 constrained 
presidential power and held it accountable to other government branches, successfully 
meeting specific democratic criteria.  
C. CONCLUSIONS 
Yushchenko's actions during his presidency have moved Ukraine further along 
the spectrum towards democracy than under Kuchma.  According to Freedom House 
scores, Ukraine became freer under Yushchenko and achieved the most democratic 
scores thus far (See Table 7).     
Ukraine became more of a polyarchy under Yushchenko than under Kuchma.   A 
polyarchy is a specific type of democracy in that it is concerned more with the electoral 
process, particularly increasing voter participation as well as the presence of an 
opposition to the majority.  While Ukraine's first round of presidential elections in 2004 
appeared as fraudulent as the 1999 election fiasco with the free-election process 
 
129 Lavelle, "Analysis: Viktor Yushchenko's agenda," 2. 
130 Warner, Tom, "Yushchenko promises more democratic constitution." Financial Times, 13 January 
2006.  
131 The election of people's deputies.  2006.  Database on line. Available from the Central Election 
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effectively stifled by the incumbent administration, the success of a mobilized populace 
in the Orange Revolution was truly a positive move toward democracy.  Such an 
occurrence would have been impossible six years ago in Ukraine with a divided 
opposition effectively neutralized by Kuchma.  The opposition's influence in 2004, which 
caused the Supreme Court to invalidate the results of the second round of presidential 
election results and hold a subsequent election, showed that the majority voice of the 
people prevailed, much as it does in a functioning democracy.  In that regard, Ukraine's 
electoral process has moved more toward freer and fairer elections, earning a Freedom 
House status of "free."   In all cases, the data suggests that under President Kuchma, 
elections in Ukraine were not democratic, whereas under President Yushchenko, 
elections have become substantially more democratic.  
Furthermore, the opposition emerged and triumphed during the 2004 presidential 
elections, something clearly stifled during the 1999 presidential elections.  Viktor 
Yushchenko's "Our Ukraine" party prevailed and peaceful protest reversed fraudulent 
election results.  Although it would appear that Ukraine became "less free" in political 
rights, a finding reinforced by ODIHR's evaluation of the 2004 first presidential election 
round, the fact that the CEC was reorganized, becoming more accountable in the election 
process and ensuring fair TEC proceedings, implies that fair elections were attainable and 
Ukrainians had more political rights.  Instances of voter coercion and state intervention 
were also present during the first round of presidential elections, reminiscent of the 
corrupt 1999 elections; however, the successful Orange Revolution overcame this 
corruption as the majority rule dwarfed the influence of the state.  Moreover, under 
Yushchenko media bias and state intervention subsided as noted during the 2006 
Verkhovna Rada elections.    
According to Diamond's first element of a liberal democracy where elected 
officials are accountable to the citizenry, Ukraine sustained its position in the democratic 
spectrum under Yushchenko.  Yushchenko's actions towards the oligarchs in the 
reprivatization of Kriyvorizhstal Steel in 2004 showed that he was intent on reducing 
oligarchic capitalism in Ukraine.  Although this was a telling case in that Yushchenko 
acted in the interests of the citizenry, particularly the middle class business owners, his 
inaction in the Gongadze murder trial have not well represented the interests of the 
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opposition.  His lack of action during the Gongadze trial conflicts with his zeal to rid 
Ukraine of oligarchic capitalism, which may indicate that he is soft on corruption and 
may be controlled by the whims of the oligarchs in the future.  
In Diamond's second criteria of a liberal democracy where the constitution 
regulated power amongst government branches, Ukraine ultimately progressed along the 
democratic spectrum under Yushchenko when compared to Kuchma.  Yushchenko's 
executive power has been constrained constitutionally and held accountable by other 
government branches, yet it is perhaps a little too constrained by the increasingly 
powerful Verkhovna Rada.  In his term thus far, regulation of presidential power is more 
evident than in the past as the Verkhovna Rada received some presidential powers.132   
The 1996 Constitution provided for a complete separation of powers between the 
president and the Verkhovna Rada and clearly defined the legislative powers of the 
president.  
Overall, there is there is considerable improvement in two of the three criteria of 
democratic measurement, specifically the emergence of a free and fair electoral process 
and the constitution, but some work remains to be done in the criterion of elected officials 
accountable to the citizenry. Ultimately, Ukraine became more of a democracy under 
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V. CONCLUSION   
In the early 1990's, Ukraine experienced a dramatic change in governance with 
the collapse of the Soviet Union and Ukraine's pursuit of sovereignty.  These events 
created a shift in governance as Ukraine underwent varying degrees of political 
transition, from nationalism under Kravchuk to authoritarianism under Kuchma to a 
fledgling democracy under Yushchenko.  Fortunately, Ukraine has made some progress 
in its transformation from a fake parliamentary style of government in the early 1990s to 
a democratic system of government.  Within the past year, there has been a shift in the 
electoral process of Ukraine noted with the outcome of the Orange Revolution and the 
Verkhovna Rada elections of 2006.  For the first time in Ukraine's history, peaceful 
public protest overturned a fraudulent election, resulting in the inauguration of the 
popular candidate.  The Orange Revolution resulted in a fair and free election process 
that removed Viktor Yanukovych and placed the publicly chosen candidate, Viktor 
Yushchenko, in power as Ukraine's president.  Following independence from USSR and 
the aftermath of the Orange Revolution, Ukraine has experienced a slow shift toward 
democratization. This independence has a relative chance to flourish, as long as elections 
continue on their present course and the country's elected officials respect the will of the 
citizenry.  
A. HOW HAS UKRAINE TRANSITIONED DEMOCRATICALLY?    
1. Democratic Evolution of the Ukrainian Election Process Since 1991 
 The electoral process in Ukraine has shifted back and forth between democratic 
freedom and authoritarian-control tendencies within the last fifteen years.  First, under 
President Kravchuk, democratic criteria of voter participation and public contestation 
were considerable, signifying a move toward polyarchal democracy.  A polyarchy is a 
specific type of democracy in that it is concerned more with the electoral process, 
particularly increasing voter participation as well as the presence of an opposition to the 
majority.  Elections were competitive at the presidential and the Verkhovna Rada level.  
Rukh and the Democratic Bloc parties represented Ukrainian nationalism in opposition to 
the CPU.  Next, free and fair contestation seemed equally prevalent in the 1994 
presidential elections with an emerging opposition, but faded once Leonid Kuchma 
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assumed control of the presidency, and subdued the opposition candidates.  Free and fair 
contestation decreased in the 1999 elections, which were grossly corrupt and biased 
towards the incumbent via OSCE reporting criteria.  Voters were coerced, media 
coverage sensationalized the incumbent and tarnished the opposition, and Kuchma 
greatly influenced the electoral process in his favor.  Not surprisingly, the survival of 
democracy seemed unlikely in the twenty-first century.  Presidential elections in 2004 
initially were as biased and corrupt as in 1999, but democracy emerged as a result of the 
2004 Orange Revolution.  The opposition's nonviolent public protest pressed the 
Supreme Court to invalidate the second-round election results and showed that the will of 
the majority prevailed, as it does in a functioning democracy.  Ultimately, Ukraine's 
electoral process has become considerably more democratic than it was in 1990, as the 
2006 Verkhovna Rada elections suggest.    
2. Genuine Power or Outside Actor's Influence?  
During each administration, the representational power vested with elected 
officials has remained consistently poor.  When balancing his constituents’ interest with 
outside actor influence, Kravchuk acted in the national interest, but was subservient to the 
CPU.  A coalition builder by nature, Kravchuk was hesitant to wield his power as the 
President of Ukraine.  On the other hand, Leonid Kuchma was not controlled by the 
whims of the oligarchs.  His political adeptness, circumvention of the Verkhovna Rada, 
and abuse of his decree power kept the weaker oligarchic clans from influencing him as 
he consolidated power.  However, Kuchma did not act in the national interest of the 
populace, and his initial platform strategy in 1994 went against the majority who 
supported Ukrainian sovereignty.  Current president Yushchenko's representative power 
as an elected official is questionable, and his actions, or lack of thereof, reveal that he 
may be influenced by the oligarchs.  While he acted decisively in reducing oligarchic 
capitalism in the reprivatization venture of Kriyvorizhstal steel, he has not achieved 
closure in the murder trial of opposition journalist Heorhiy Gongadze.  According to this 
criterion of democracy, Ukraine has not progressed along the democratic spectrum in this 
measurement.  Its elected officials have acted inconsistently over the years in the 
citizenry's interest and have been influenced by either the CPU or the oligarchs.   
   
 53
                                                
3. Executive Power Regulated by the Constitution and Held Accountable 
by Other Government Branches? 
The Constitution of Ukraine has undergone sweeping changes over the years, but 
has generally progressed towards democracy.  Initially, under Kravchuk, the Law of the 
Presidency in 1991 vaguely described the powers of the president.  The old SSR 
Constitution of 1978 had ineffectively established a separation of powers between the 
executive, legislative, and judicial branches of the Ukrainian government.  As a result, 
the Verkhovna Rada and the president shared legislative and executive power, which was 
not truly addressed until the 1996 Constitution of Ukraine.  Consequently, Kravchuk’s 
presidential powers were poorly defined, as executive power was not constrained 
constitutionally but was held accountable by the Verkhovna Rada.  Under Kuchma, the 
1995 Constitutional Agreement enabled the president to increase his influence as it 
dismantled the deputy system of the 1978 SSR Constitution and gave Kuchma distinctive 
leverage over the Verkhovna Rada.  The 1995 Constitutional Agreement gave Kuchma 
veto powers and the ability to form and dismiss the Cabinet of Ministers.  Finally an 
effective checks and balances system was in place.  The 1996 Constitution was a positive 
move toward  democratic transition in that it provided for a complete separation of 
powers between the executive and legislative branches of government, clearly defined the 
legislative powers of the president, and restored equilibrium between the branches of 
government.  In this regard, Ukraine has become more democratic and has shifted away 
from authoritarianism as presidential power has become constrained constitutionally and 
branches of Ukraine's government are held accountable by one another.   
B. FREEDOM  SCORE COMPARISON OF PRESIDENTIAL 
ADMINISTRATIONS  
Ukraine has become more of a democracy when examining political rights 
transformation from 1991 to 2006.  Under Kravchuk, political rights achieved a freedom 
score of three, which falls into the partly-free category according to Freedom House.133  
Freedom House political rights scores became less free under Kuchma, and were awarded 
a score of four, due most likely to Kuchma’s manipulation of the electoral commission 
and control of the media.  Eventually, Ukraine scored a three in 2006, becoming freer.  
 
133 Freedom in the World Comparative Rankings 1972-2004 and 2006 Freedom in the World 
Rankings. Database on-line. Available from Freedom House.    
http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=15&year=2005 (Accessed 1 May 2006).   
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This was largely due to the opposition’s growing support and the Orange Revolution’s 
ability to overcome fraudulent elections and the positive democratic traits observed by 
ODIHR during the 2006 Verkhovna Rada elections.    
 PR CL Status 
1991 3 3 PF 
1994 3 4 PF 
1999 3 4 PF 
2004 4 3 PF 
2006 3 2 F 
 
Table 11 Freedom Scores comparison from Ukraine's independence to Post Orange 
Revolution. (From Ref 134)  
 
"PR" stands for Political Rights, "CL" stands for Civil Liberties, and "PF" stands for 
partly free.  Freedom House evaluations use a scale of 1-7 with 1 representing the highest 
degree of  freedom present, and 7 being the lowest level. 134 
 
According to Dahl's model, Ukraine is somewhere in the middle of the democratic 
spectrum, between a closed hegemony and a polyarchy.135  A closed hegemony regime is 
the least democratic regime according to Dahl.136  In this type of system, voter 
participation is practically nonexistent and there is little or no public contestation.  A 
polyarchy is on the other end of the spectrum and is a specific type of democracy that is 
more concerned more with the electoral process, particularly increasing voter 
participation as well as the presence of an opposition to the majority.  Ukraine's elections 
have become more participatory and free, as evidenced by OSCE election reports, and 
public contestation has increased as a result of the Orange Revolution.  However, elected 
officials' power which is truly representative of its constituents has not progressed..  
Political figures have more or less tried to act in the interests of the citizenry, but have 
time and again been influenced by the CPU and the Ukrainian oligarchs.  On the other 
hand, the evolution of Ukraine's Constitution has made positive progress toward the 
country's democratic transition.  The Constitution of Ukraine has transformed 
                                                 
134 Freedom in the World Comparative Rankings 1972-2004 and 2006 Freedom in the World 
Rankings. Database on-line. Available from Freedom House.    
http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=15&year=2005 (Accessed 1 May 2006).   
135 Dahl, Polyarchy; participation and opposition, 7.  
136 Ibid.  
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tremendously from the democratically ineffective SSR Constitution of 1978, and now 
regulates the power between the executive and legislative branches of the government.   
Although the previous three presidencies have had a lack of continuity and questionable 
agendas, incremental progress toward a democratic Ukraine has continued with its 
election practices and constitutional revisions. The future of a complete democratic 
reform within Ukraine may rest on the vision of the next parliament, as the Verkhovna 
Rada is more powerful than the president and subject to oligarchic influence.  
C. U.S. POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
While some may argue that Ukraine’s progress toward democracy is of little 
importance to the United States, the opposite is true. The democratization of Ukraine 
could hinder future relations between the United States and Russia.  Interestingly, both 
countries backed different presidential leaders in the 2004 presidential elections, 
channeling substantial funds into each candidate's campaign fund to ensure victory.  
"Viktor Yanukovych was openly backed by the Vladimir Putin, and Russian money was 
said to account for half of his campaign funds."137 On the other hand, "…the Bush 
administration alone was said to have channeled sixty-five million dollars to aid political 
organization in Ukraine in the last two years." 138  Evidently, both the U.S. and Russia 
had far different intentions for the future of Ukraine.  The West focused on the electoral 
process and supported free and fair elections intent on spreading democracy throughout 
the region. Russia clearly had a different agenda for Ukraine; a return to the Russian 
sphere of influence.  "The Kremlin’s goal was to recreate a regime in Ukraine that was 
not favorable to the West.  It would therefore be more dependent on Russia."139  
Despite the fact that Ukraine’s transition to democracy has the potential to 
damage U.S.-Russian relations, the Orange Revolution brought the United States and the 
European Union closer.  Both believe in promoting democracy in Ukraine and Eastern 
Europe, and Ukraine's democratic transition contributed to Western unity between the EU 
and United States; two actors who have had frequent disputes in the past regarding the 
 
137 Ascher, "Deciding on the Borderland: The Ukrainian Elections of 2004," 3 
138 Ibid.  
139 Åslund and McFaul , Revolution in orange: The origins of Ukraine's democratic breakthrough, 
161.  
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level of political intervention.140  However, promotion of democracy in this region is not 
achieved without some degree of cost.  U.S. foreign policy toward this region needs to 
consider the cost of propagating democracy and discern if the they are willing to endure 
potential Russian repercussions.  
 
140 Ibid, 141.  
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